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Abstract 
 
PERSPECTIVES AND ANGLES: A JOURNALISTIC HISTORY THROUGH THE 
ARGENTINE POLITICAL IDENTITY FROM 1946-1983 
 
Sarah Cusick 
B.A., Bob Jones University 
M.A., Appalachian State University 
 
 
Chairperson:  Lynne Getz, Ph.D. 
 
 
 Following World War II, nationalist strongman Juan Perón influenced the 
Argentine national identity through his controversial political, economic, and 
social reforms. Though a popular friend of the proletariat, Perón earned many 
enemies by ignoring and alienating the land-owning elites, the middle class, and 
the liberal intelligentsia. By following the personal histories of journalists Jacobo 
Timerman and Robert Cox, editors of major Buenos Aires news sources La 
Opinión and The Buenos Aires Herald, this paper will chronicle and analyze the 
shifts in individual and national Argentine identities beginning during the 
polarizing era of Peronism and extending through the Dirty War.  
Due to a series of personal and societal shocks, designed to simultaneously 
eradicate alleged political subversives and implement neoliberal economic 
policies via disaster capitalism, Argentines ceased to identify as pro- or anti-
Perón, but rather developed their evolving personalities around the memory of the 
citizens disappeared at the hand of the National Reorganization Process, or 
Proceso, junta. Timerman, Cox, and their constituent readers, including the 
members of the human rights group the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, shaped 
their own histories and the history of their country by fearlessly carrying 
 v 
Argentina through a bloody Dirty War, and fighting on behalf of the voiceless—
the thousands of Argentine disappeared.   
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 1 
Chapter 1 
An Introduction 
  
 2 
Introduction to Historical Context 
 
 In 1930 Argentina experienced a political and economic turning point. As the 
Great Depression wreaked havoc upon most of the world’s economy, Argentina found a 
niche in global trade by exporting grain, wheat, and other primary materials for 
production to the Northern Hemisphere. The Argentine ruling class, wealthy landowners 
with strong ties to imperialist Great Britain, pushed for a strengthening of bilateral trade 
with the United Kingdom via 1933’s Roca-Runciman Pact, which gave the Argentine 
state greater control over the regulation of both capital and exports. The formation of a 
Banco Central in 1935 permitted the government to regulate the exchange of money; the 
formation of the National Grain and Meat Boards tightened regulations upon the prices of 
commodities for export. These regulations translated to a thriving economy. When the 
rest of the world went bankrupt, Argentina packed her coffers full. 
1
 
During the Depression, Argentina set itself upon a trajectory for future inward 
expansion, or a nationalized focus on regulation of capital and resources inside the 
borders of Argentina. In 1930, the economic successes of Argentina coincided with 
political turmoil; after sixty-eight years of civilian rule, Argentines witnessed the upset of 
their government. Between 1930 and 1976, nine successful military coups d’état and 
twenty-one separate presidents ruled Argentina. The varying agendas and tumultuous 
                                                        
1 James P. Brennan, “Prolegomenon to Neoliberalism: The Political Economy of 
Populist Argentina, 1943-1976,” Latin American Perspectives 34, no. 3 (May 2007): 
50, http://0-www.jstor.org.wncln.wncln.org/stable/27648022 (accessed April 1, 
2013). 
 3 
escapades of dissenting military factions began shaking the foundations of the country’s 
economy, though not disrupting it altogether. 
2
 
Throughout World War II, Argentina’s place in the global economic realm 
remained relatively strong. While surrounding Latin American countries experienced 
traumatic aftershocks of war upon their economies, Argentina distinguished its place in 
the Southern Cone region as a nation of means; the Banco Central continued accruing 
wealth to spare. Argentina granted rebuilding loans to neighboring countries and invested 
in the rebuilding of global economic networks following the war. 
3
 
In 1946 during this time of post-war success, military colonel Juan Domingo 
Perón triumphantly took the presidential office, introducing Argentina to the first wave of 
political, economic, and social Peronism. 
4
 Peronism became synonymous with the 
enduring cult around the populism of Perón. Perón’s populism entailed a focus on the 
needs of the masses—the workers—over individual civic liberties. The masses were great 
in number, and appreciated a president who spoke on behalf of their previously ignored 
needs. Populist Peronism translated to a strong national Argentine identity, sentiments of 
                                                        
2 Thomas C. Wright, State Terrorism in Latin America: Chile, Argentina, and 
International Human Rights, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 96. 
3 James Brennan, “Prolegomenom to Neoliberalism: The Political Economy of 
Populist Argentina, 1943-1976,” Latin American Perspectives 34, 3, Contested 
Transformation (May 2007): 50. http://0-
www.jstor.org.wncln.wncln.org/stable/27648022. 
4 Though many definitions of “Peronism” exist, the concise, apt definition of Mark 
Falcoff will be utilized in this paper: “an ill-defined mélange of populism, 
personalism, and nationalism;” i.e., Perón’s personal cult of popular nationalism 
based upon a unified national identity, championed by the popular class, which led 
Argentina into the formation of a nationally organized, inwardly focused corporate 
state. A more detailed discussion of Peronism will follow in Chapter 2. See: Mark 
Falcoff. “Orange Juice with General Perón: A Memoir,” The American Scholar 62, no. 
3 (Summer 1993): 383, http://0-www.jstor.org.wncln.wncln.org/stable/41 
(accessed April 1, 2013).  
 4 
nationalism, an increasingly educated bourgeoisie class, and the implementations of 
centrist Raúl Prebisch’s Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) model of 
developmentalism economics. Perón’s bottom line as a populist president was to address 
the needs of the proletariat, redistribute wealth, and allow the bulging national coffers to 
be shared among all Argentines. Rather than focus on the exportation of primary goods 
for production elsewhere, Perón and Prebisch preached that the best way to grow 
Argentina’s economy internationally was to turn economic focus inward, developing 
technology and production. 
5
 
Perón augmented the economic reforms of the 1930s, continuing on the pre-
existing political and economic trends of internalization and nationalization. The populist 
hero understood the limitations of local capitalists, specifically in relation to his changing 
policies, and in order to best grow the middle class, he nationalized the nation’s railroads, 
protected tariffs, controlled imports and exports, and demanded import licenses—all 
direct extensions of the tenents set forth in the Roca-Runciman Pact. Perón did not turn 
the economy of Argentina upside down; rather he let it run an organic course on an 
existing trajectory. Within that trajectory, Peronism did not uproot the Argentine 
chronology or infuse a new-found national identity in Argentines; rather, Peronism, 
through economic and social reforms and with populism and sentiments of Argentine 
nationalism at the heart, deepened the identity of the Argentine citizen. 
6
 
                                                        
5 Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (New York: 
Picador, 2007), Kindle edition, 66. See also: John Crabtree, “Review of Populist 
Seduction in Latin America: The Ecuadorian Experience, by Carlos de la Torre,” 
Journal of Latin American Studies 34, no. 4 (November 2002): 985. 
http://0www.jstor.org.wncln.wncln.org/stable/3875744 (accessed April 4, 2013). 
6 Brennan, “Prolegomenon to Neoliberalism,” 51-52.  
 5 
However, regardless of the national identity being augmented by Peronism, Juan 
Domingo Perón as a man could not hold on to the power of his own name. Following 
repeated conflicts with the middle and upper class, the Argentine intelligentsia, the 
Catholic Church, and his own military, Perón fled in exile, traveling through Latin 
America and Europe, rebuilding his identity, and permitting, in and by his absence, the 
cult of Peronism to frenetically thrive as a subculture of underground politics. Peronist 
identities outside of Perón’s personal identity took root. Many Argentines, dissatisfied 
with the state of political affairs, formed various left-to-right factions of Peronism. Perón 
the man had repeatedly winked at the use of violence to achieve peace, stating, “Violence 
from above engenders violence from below.” Peronists began embracing this tit-for-tat 
ideology in response to real and perceived threats of oppression from the state. Though 
Perón had many followers among the working class, his opponents, including the junta 
that deposed him, held great political power as well. “Peronist” and “anti-Peronist” 
became national identities not just around the cult of a man, but also around the violent 
political policies he advocated. 
7
  
It was during Perón’s exile that journalists Jacobo Timerman and Robert “Bob” 
Cox emerged upon the political scene. Jacobo Timerman, a self-described liberal Jew, 
immigrated with his family to Argentina in 1928 at age five from Soviet-controlled 
Ukraine. Growing up in the Jewish Quarter, a poor ethnic neighborhood in Buenos Aires, 
Timerman was bombarded daily by his family, neighbors, and fellow temple-goers to 
deepen his Jewish identity by participating in political activist groups that focused on the 
                                                        
7 Falcoff, “Orange Juice with General Perón: A Memoir,” 383.  See also: Jacobo 
Timerman, Prisoner Without A Name, Cell Without a Number, 24.  
 6 
implementation of Judaism and Zionism into global sociopolitical landscape, political 
ideologies that starkly contrasted with the nationalism and populism of Perón.  
Timerman had just graduated university in Buenos Aires and was at the beginning 
his journalist career around the time Perón fled Argentina. Timerman’s soon-to-be friend 
and colleague Bob Cox spent the 1950s working as a newspaper delivery boy, a reporter, 
and a British Korean-War soldier. Returning home to the United Kingdom following his 
participation in the Korean Conflict, Cox found England to be exceptionally “drab.” 
Seeking to make his fortune, he moved, alone, to exotic Buenos Aires, Argentina, where 
he arrived five years after Perón’s exile. Cox, armed with a strong sense of duty to his job 
and to the truth, accepted a job at The Buenos Aires Herald, the English-language news 
equivalent of La Opinión, the Spanish-language moderate periodical founded by 
Timerman in 1971. 
8
 
While these men were focusing on their careers as journalists, Hebe de Bonafini, 
Azucena Villaflor de Devicenti, and Matilde Mellibovsky were working inside their 
homes, raising children, keeping house, and remaining largely apolitical. These three 
women who identities focused around being wives and mothers had little in common 
during the early foreshadowings of Argentine political unrest. These women would soon 
find, as they began running into one another in Cox and Timerman’s news offices, that 
they shared a unique bond amongst themselves and thousands of other women: the loss of 
their children at the hands of state-sponsored terrorism.  
                                                        
8 David Cox, Dirty Secrets, Dirty War (Charleston: Evening Post Publishing Company, 
2008), Kindle edition. See also: Timerman, Prisoner Without A Name, Cell Without a 
Number, 22. 
 7 
Cox and Timerman noticed this violent chaos in its earliest stages. Both 
journalists experienced Peronism and the contributing factors that came together to incite 
what would be commonly known as the Argentine Dirty War—this period of state-
sponsored terrorism against alleged subversives and political dissidents. Both journalists, 
Timerman with his fearless activist mentality, and Cox with his deeply rooted British 
sense of duty to job and truth, observed the increasing amount of violence incited by 
underground Peronist and other anti-governmental guerrilla groups. Timerman and Cox 
witnessed, reported upon, and regularly published about those who became known as the 
disappeared. The disappeared were the citizens who were arrested by the Argentine 
government without warrant or writs of habeas corpus. These innocent citizens were 
often tortured and killed, many dropped into the Atlantic Ocean.
9
 
In solidarity with those targeted by the government, both journalists printed 
names of the disappeared and reported in code about the political intrigue of Argentina. 
Both journalists came to understand from both an outsider’s and insider’s point of view 
the terror of disappearance. Both journalists observed the tragic loss of identity and 
personhood of thousands of Argentines—both on the left and the right side of the 
political spectrum. Disappeared persons were assumed to be neither dead nor alive. 
Timerman and Cox assisted hundreds of relatives of the disappeared who sought justice 
for their lost family members. Timerman and Cox were engaged daily in investigative 
journalism and editorial writing, seeking to expose the Argentine government for waging 
war upon its citizens. 
10
  
                                                        
9 Cox, Dirty Secrets, Dirty War, Kindle edition. 
10 Cox, Dirty Secrets, Dirty War, Kindle edition. See also: Marguerite Feitlowitz, 
“Night and Fog in Argentina,” Salmagundi 94/95 (Spring-Summer 1992): 43-44, 
 8 
These newsmen, too close to breaking the full story, were perceived as a threat by 
their government. Both journalists miraculously lived through the Dirty War, in spite of 
receiving numerous threats from varying military-terrorist factions, in spite of being 
arrested unjustly, and in spite of being released into exile, Timerman to Israel, Cox to the 
United States. While Timerman, following his disappearance and four-year span of 
journalistic inactivity, channeled all his previously preserved energy into the creation and 
publication of politically driven memoirs, letters, and exposés. Prisoner Without a Name, 
Cell Without a Number was the culmination of Timerman’s pleas for international 
attention on behalf of the disappeared Argentines, specifically Jewish-Argentines. 
 Robert Cox, traumatized by the direct effects of socio-political intrigue upon his 
person(al life), was content to be alive and have his family intact in their new South 
Carolina home. Cox, in fact, “still find[s] it too painful to relive those malevolent times 
by writing about them.” He did not speak of his traumatic experience with Argentine 
politics for twenty-five years. Finally, he permitted his son to write his memoirs on his 
behalf. He called David’s subsequent (auto)biography Dirty Secrets, Dirty War the book 
that he emotionally and physically “could not write.” 
11
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
http://0-www.jstor.org.wncln.wncln.org/stable/40548602 (accessed April 1, 
2013). See also: Mabel Bellucci, “Childless Motherhood: Interview with Nora 
Cortiñas, a Mother of the Plaza de Mayo, Argentina,” Reproductive Health Matters 7, 
no. 13 (May 1999): 84, http://0-www.jstor.org.wncln.wncln.org/stable/3775707 
(accessed April 1, 2013); Robert Cox, Dirty Secrets, Dirty War (Charleston: Evening 
Post Publishing Company, 2008), Foreword, Kindle edition. 
11 Robert Cox, Dirty Secrets, Dirty War (Charleston: Evening Post Publishing 
Company, 2008), Foreword, Kindle edition. 
 9 
Primary Sources and Historiography 
 The historical context of this paper is built upon relevant primary and secondary 
source material from and about the events surrounding the Dirty War, including the 
(auto)biographies of Jacobo Timerman and Robert Cox. The first and most utilized 
source for this paper is the autobiographical account of Jacobo Timerman’s 
disappearance, Prisoner Without a Name, Cell Without a Number. Timerman’s work, part 
memoir, part horror story, part invocation, serves as the insider’s point of view of the 
evolving discourse of one who was disappeared by his own adopted government.  
Timerman’s history is disoriented, emotional, and anachronous, which directly 
contradicts his orderly journalistic training and expertise. This out-of-order, down-the-
rabbit-hole style of writing deftly succeeds in mirroring the tone of unbridled chaos that 
he and his countrymen experienced surviving the shocks and terrors of the Dirty War—
that is, the resounding shocks that echoed from inside the torture cell in waves across the 
entire Latin American region. The title of Timerman’s book evokes the status of the 
faceless, numberless, sightless, meaningless disappeared prisoner. Timerman’s training 
as a journalist and knack for weaving together a story give Prisoner Without a Name, 
Cell Without a Number an inherent eerie feel: as one reads through the book, in or out of 
order, one sees immediately, at a glance, the conglomeration of factors that came together 
to create the identity of one man, a typical Argentine citizen of his time.  
Timerman, an immigrant boy from humble Jewish beginnings; an educated 
professional; and a life-long social activist and an avid participant in politics was in the 
cross section of the ideal candidate who would find himself among the disappeared. 
Prisoner Without a Name, Cell Without a Number describes three major events of 
 10 
Timerman’s life. These events correlate to three identity-shaping events that took place 
over the course of Timerman’s life: his introduction to Zionism, his disappearance, and 
his exile to Israel. Timerman’s book leaps around from his childhood to his imprisonment 
to his exile, echoing motifs of chaos, disorder, and confusion—the resounding sentiments 
from inside the cell without a number. 
Robert Cox was never able to tell the story of his own interaction with Argentine 
journalism and politics. Rather, he finally commissioned his son, David Cox, who lived 
through the Dirty War as well, to chronicle their family’s personal history in Dirty 
Secrets, Dirty War. David Cox’s book is a well-researched (auto)biography, placing one 
family in the context of broad-scale trauma and torture. Cox presents his father’s opinions 
as opinions, observing that Bob Cox’s conservative views and firm establishment in the 
upper-middle class of Buenos Aires society contributed to his stark anti-Peronist 
sentiments. Robert Cox’s motto of “do your job, report the truth” placed him squarely 
against the oppressive military regimes of Argentina, including those of the Peronists and 
the subsequent National Reorganization Process, or Proceso, regime, which was designed 
to violently, upon the blood of its own citizens, reorganize the Argentine political and 
economic structure in favor of neoliberal capitalism.  
David Cox chronicles his father’s history seamlessly; he himself was an integral 
part of that history, after all. David, his siblings, and their mother were the main reasons 
that Cox left Argentina following his political arrest and never looked back. By saving 
the lives of his son and his family, he unwittingly provided a channel for his own history 
to come forth into the permanent record.  
 11 
Perhaps most interesting is the length of elapsed time from Cox’s exile to his 
son’s writing of his memoirs. Juxtaposed with Timerman’s immediate and frenetic 
writing following his release, the historian can observe the different aftereffects of 
traumatic shocks on individuals, proving that the human factor cannot be whittled out of 
so-called “forced disaster capitalism” and the pure “blank slate” ideology. Cox, a man 
with a large family, had much to lose during the Dirty War. If the shocks of neoliberalism 
succeeded in silencing Robert Cox, it was but for a time, until his son was academically 
and emotionally prepared to write Robert’s story on his behalf. In this manner, David 
Cox echoes the sentiments of key figures in Dirty Secrets, Dirty War, the Mothers of the 
Plaza de Mayo. 
12
 
Though much academic research has surfaced in response to the role of the 
Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, this paper will concentrate on Matilde Mellibovsky’s 
Circle of Love Over Death, scraps of the stories told by the mothers themselves. 
Mellibovsky provides insight to the overlapping identities of the Argentine woman and 
mother, piecing together the smatterings of social views, religious affiliations, and 
academic achievements of the members of the now-famous human rights groups. 
Through the words of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo themselves, Mellibovksy edits 
together their story in a piecemeal, anachronistic, highly disoriented style à la Jacobo 
Timerman.  
Individual mothers recount their experiences: that of a son’s mischievous smile, 
their daughter’s academic achievements, and poetry about “childless motherhood.” 
Different mothers provide their perspectives of joining together on Thursday, April 30, 
                                                        
12 Naomi Klein. The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (New York: 
Picador, 2007), Kindle edition, 23, 33-34.  
 12 
1977 to march quietly, arm in arm, two by two, in circles around the plaza of Buenos 
Aries in honor of their disappeared children.
13
 
 Softly circulating among military guards and civilians, the mothers wore white 
kerchiefs on their heads, symbols of the diapers of their lost babies. Their head coverings 
stood out as a symbol of peace, of femininity, and of the intangible, unbreakable bond 
between mother and child. Though Mellibovsky’s book is not academic, Circle of Love 
Over Death provides an unpretentious insider’s peak into the lives of those most 
tragically indirectly affected by the aftershocks of neoliberalism, the mothers of the 
disappeared. 
Secondary sources consulted include well-researched recent contributions to Latin 
American and global history. Naomi Klein said her book, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise 
of Disaster Capitalism, is an extension of Susan Sontag’s Illness As a Metaphor. The 
Shock Doctrine explains how a society viewed both inherently and externally as “sick” 
has no choice but to accept treatment from whatever charlatan willing enough to offer it. 
With no other alternative for their society, citizens accept forced political, social, and 
economic “reforms” that they would ordinarily, under stable conditions, never consider 
permissible to democracy. 
 The doctrine of shock works on three levels and describes three main events that 
shock the macro and microcosms of a society. The first shock occurs as a natural or 
seemingly natural traumatic event like a famine, hurricane, fire, or war. This widespread, 
devastating shock is followed by a shock from power-hungry politicians and capitalist 
                                                        
13 Mabel Bellucci, “Childless Motherhood: Interview with Nora Cortiñas, a Mother of 
the Plaza de Mayo, Argentina,” Reproductive Health Matters 7, no. 13 (May 1999): 
84. http://0-www.jstor.org.wncln.wncln.org/stable/3775707 (accessed April 1, 
2013). 
 13 
corporations to the existing social, economic, or political systems. Said politicians and 
capitalists, exploiting the horror of the initial shock, frame a second shock as “shock 
therapy,” or the necessary medicine administered by the capitalist doctors of Milton 
Freeman’s Chicago School of Economics as the only way to obtain a better prognosis for 
such an ailing, injured, ill society. The third, possibly most disturbing shock is the 
physical, torturous shock administered by the government; both covert and open violence 
is administered to citizens as a necessary response to control the “subversives” who do 
not comply with the new, shocking system of rule. In the case of Argentina, the 
blueprints for Klein’s Shock Doctrine seem to line up directly over Timerman’s shocking 
account Prisoner Without a Name, Cell Without a Number. 
14
 
While Klein discusses the shock doctrine in terms of economics, John Dinges’s 
The Condor Years: How Pinochet and His Allies Brought Terrorism to Three Continents 
interconnects the political fates of Milton Freeman, Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, 
Augusto Pinochet, the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, and thousands of disappeared in 
his history text turned thriller. Dinges’s work effectively displays both the internal 
situation of Argentina and Latin America, as well as the correlation of Argentina and 
Latin America to the large-scale scheme of global politics.  
Dinges utilizes recently declassified documents of the United States military to 
create an exposé on “Operation Condor,” the code name for the operation of six Latin 
                                                        
14 Naomi Klein. The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (New York: 
Picador, 2007), Kindle edition, 25-26. See also: Reyhan Harmanci, “Out Loud: Naomi 
Klein discusses ‘The Shock Doctrine,’ ” San Francisco Chronicle, September 26, 2007. 
http://www.sfgate.com/thingstodo/article/Out-Loud-Naomi-Klein-discusses-The-
Shock-2500992.php (accessed April 1, 2013).  
 
 14 
American military governments’ information-sharing network. Officially formed in 1975, 
this operation was directly responsible for the disappearance of thousands of Latin 
Americans. What is even more shocking is that many of the governments and operatives 
of Operation Condor received direct financing, information, and manpower from the 
United States C.I.A. The Cold War binaries of capitalism and communism became 
swirled into Argentine economics and politics, affecting individuals’ identities and 
national identity simultaneously. 
  Thomas C. Wright’s State Terrorism in Latin America: Chile, Argentina, and 
International Human Rights compares and contrasts the chronologies of Chile and 
Argentina through not only their mutual military cooperation in Operation Condor, but 
also through the human rights organizations that sprung up within both countries as a 
result of the need created by the violence of said oppressive military regimes. Wright’s 
work seamlessly aligns the naturally occurring parallels in both countries’ political and 
social histories, speaking in a voice that echoes the call of Timerman, the Mothers of the 
Plaza de Mayo, and the world. Clearly demonstrating the overlapping trends, political 
evolutions, and violent and nonviolent social revolutions of Chile and Argentina, State 
Terrorism examines the human rights violations that occurred within each country, 
proving that the human rights organizations and the military regimes that oppressed them 
possessed a reciprocal relationship, each affecting the identity and strength of the other. 
15
 
Wright points out that during times of state oppression most of print media was 
controlled, or at the very least censored, by the government. Wright explains that 
                                                        
15 Thomas Wright, State Terrorism in Latin America: Chile, Argentina, and 
International Human Rights (New York: Roman & Littlefield Publishers, INC, 2007), 
xv. 
 15 
newspaper articles, books, and films of the Dirty War era must be taken at face value as 
potentially tainted primary source materials. Press releases and news articles written by 
or on behalf of the military junta often expressed a direct disconnect from the obvious 
and visible truth experienced by Argentines at large. Instead of studying explicitly 
traditional primary sources, Wright values memoirs and testimonial writings of those who 
were disappeared—those who actually lived through violent torture and survived to tell. 
Wright’s sources also draw from the collected testimonies from truth commissions and 
other human rights organizations, highlighting the story of individual Argentines. By 
compiling together biographies and demonstrating the disconnect between the viewpoints 
of the oppressors and the oppressed, Wright analyzes the public and private transcripts of 
Argentina to paint a complete picture of the history of the region. 
16
 
Though Wright does not make an emotional appeal to his readers, he chronicles 
the many ever-growing appeals of human rights organizations such as the Madres of the 
Plaza de Mayo, who, to this day, march to remember the atrocities of the last century. 
The Madres and their allies have demanded, and in many cases obtained, justice on 
behalf of their loved ones, the disappeared. Incorporating journalistic tendencies in the 
manner of Timerman, Klein, and Dinges, and evoking the call of memory in the vein of 
the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, this examination of Dirty Wars of Chile and Argentina 
synchronously joins two countries’ histories together, and sets the tone for a history of 
interweaving stories, overlapping examinations of cause and effect, and evolving 
identities within the macro and microcosms. 
                                                        
16 Thomas Wright, State Terrorism in Latin America: Chile, Argentina, and 
International Human Rights, xiii-xiv. 
 16 
Naomi Klein never lived in Argentina, but she focused much of her research on 
Argentina and the Southern Cone of Latin America. With a knack for connecting 
seemingly unrelated events, locations, policies, philosophies, governments, institutions, 
and individuals all together, Klein, a Canadian journalist, stumbled upon the intricacies of 
Dirty War politics whilst researching to write a book exposing the utilization of torture in 
modern history. Klein’s book, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, 
analyzes both shock treatments to the individual and large-scale shocks in the form of 
disaster capitalism, which thrives on country- and region-wide shocks as a means of 
economic “reform.”  
Klein, in true journalistic style, sniffed out a story, revealing that since the Cold 
War the United States perceived an antidemocratic threat in Latin America and utilized 
experiments with electroshock “therapy” as a way to brainwash people, i.e., completely 
wipe a human being’s brain and create a “blank slate” to “unmake and recreate” faulty 
brains into “reformed,” highly functional personalities. In laboratory settings, patients 
could indeed be completely broken down; however their personalities could never be 
correctly reprogrammed. The shocking experiments proved little else than that there was 
no sure-fire way to clear out the human brain into a perfectly blank slate, and there was 
certainly no way to rebuild a personality successfully. 
17
 
Predatory capitalists, specifically followers of Milton Friedman and his neoliberal 
policies, often utilized the philosophy of this torture methodology on a grand scale. 
Following a major crisis, such as a military junta, a war, a famine, or a flood, these so-
called “disaster capitalists” swooped in upon the newly shocked, disoriented victims, 
                                                        
17 Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, 33-34. 
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defunding and privatizing social programs, and deregulating state control of capital and 
assets. Friedman states in his essay “Capitalism and Freedom” that only disasters, 
whether real or perceived, produce true change. Klein notes that Friedman’s actions were 
equivalent to Machiavelli gone out of control: injuries must be inflicted all at once for a 
permanent departure from the “tyranny of the status quo.” 
18
 
 This shock doctrine, popularized by Milton Friedman and exposed for what it is 
by Naomi Klein, directly affected every Argentine during the Dirty War. What translated 
as state-sponsored terrorism to Jacobo Timerman and Robert Cox was actually, Klein 
reveals, the purposefully shocking trauma of the implementation of neoliberal economic 
policies. Argentina, following the coup d’état of 1976, was indeed disoriented and 
reeling. Though most Argentines were accustomed to coups d'état and authoritarian 
military regimes, they were certainly not accustomed to their own government 
disappearing between 10,000 and 30,000 of its own citizens. 
19
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Purpose and Methodology  
After World War II, Argentines, political or not, loosely identified as either pro- 
or anti-Peronist, with other facets such as family ties, religious affiliations, and 
professional positions affecting personal identities. This paper will track identity shifts in 
Argentines, beginning at the close of World War II with the implementation of the Import 
Substitution Industrialization model through the shocking traumas of the Dirty War of the 
1970s and early 1980s when thousands of Argentines were disappeared. 
This paper amplifies the unified message of thousands of (a)political activists 
across Argentina and the globe: the call for a government to value the freedom of 
humanity over freedom of the market. Two local newsmen printed this call in their 
respective newspapers each time they publicized the names of the disappeared and called 
for social justice on their behalf. When these men were wrongfully arrested, the relatives, 
specifically the mothers, of the disappeared stood up on their behalf, publically 
organizing and creating a social platform calling attention to the abuses of human rights 
in Argentina and the Southern Cone.  
Within a very short time of the organization of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, 
not only were the disappeared receiving increasing levels of national news coverage and 
support from international human groups, but also those demanding their release, such as 
the mothers, began gaining a global following as well. This paper tracks self-adopted 
identities such as “Peronist,” “anti-Peronist,” “journalist,” and “childless mother” and 
juxtaposes them with governmentally assigned labels such as “subversive,” “terrorist,” 
“undesirable”, and “no one.” All these identities coalesce into one super-identity 
concerning disappearance: the identity of and around the disappeared.   
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This paper contributes in a unique and new way to the historiography of 
Argentina by filtering the (auto)biographies of disappeared journalists Jacobo Timerman 
and Robert Cox through Naomi Klein’s journalistic exposé of the true cause of the Dirty 
War in Argentina—the joint effort of the U.S. C.I.A., Milton Friedman and his Chicago 
Boys, and the Proceso junta to shock Argentines and create a blank slate upon which to 
build an unimpeded laboratory setting for disaster capitalism to thrive. Further 
contributing to the breadth of research on Dirty War Argentina, this paper will 
demonstrate the shifting role of women in reference to their identities as mothers, which 
further demonstrates the change in Argentine identities from apolitical to actively 
political, caused directly by the shocking occurrences of disappearances within 
Argentina. By examining and analyzing the pre- and post-Dirty War identities of Jacobo 
Timerman and Robert Cox and chronicling the evolving role of Argentine motherhood, 
this paper will prove that the traumatic shocks of forced neoliberalism failed to create a 
blank-slate Argentine political identity, but rather succeeded in shifting the Argentine 
identity from the cult(s) of (anti-)Peronism to a new, unified focus around the identity of 
the disappeared. 
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Content and Chapter Map  
The first chapter of this paper serves as an introduction and states the purpose of 
the paper. By creating a backdrop to the historical context of Argentina’s place in 
twentieth century history, Chapter One empowers the reader, without being a subject-
matter expert, to follow the remaining chapters as they chronicle the impact of 
Argentina’s social, political, and economic identity. By introducing three journalists, 
Jacobo Timerman, Robert Cox, and Naomi Klein and by broadly analyzing their 
overlapping journalistic content, Chapter One demonstrates the unified message of the 
call to social justice as rooted in human connections, which are transcendent of print or 
electronic media, and which cannot be rooted out of the human brain, regardless of the 
oppressive infliction of repeated shocks upon an individual or a society.   
By connecting journalists Jacobo Timerman and Robert Cox to Naomi Klein’s 
shocking picture of the socio-political ramifications of the forced implementation of 
neoliberalism, Chapter One introduces the central thesis of the paper: Though the puppet 
masters of the Chicago School of Economics succeeded both in implementing their 
sordid brand of disaster capitalism and in silencing the perceived subversive threat of 
thousands of moderate to left leaning citizens, they failed to factor in the emotional 
impact of the aftershocks of said trauma on the existing members of society, i.e., the 
outcry of those who escaped torture and disappearance, as well as those left behind by 
disappeared Argentines who never reappeared.  
Chapter Two scaffolds the introductory material of Chapter One into a historical 
framework for analysis. This chapter begins by introducing the international discourse of 
the human rights movement, which began synchronously with Juan Perón’s rise to power. 
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By exploring the identities of Juan Perón and his supporters through the eyes of Jacobo 
Timerman and Robert Cox, as well as by understanding the personal histories of these 
two journalists, which affects their perceptions and interactions with Peronism, Chapter 
Two synthesizes a composite of factors that shaped the Argentine identity, e.g, post-war 
politics and economics, and an explanation of Peronism, populism, nationalism, and ISI 
developmentalism.   
This portion of the paper will also examine the role of Eva Perón in altering the 
political status of women in Argentina. Mrs. Perón’s captivating charms, which 
engendered the support of Argentine women, helped paved the way for the female voice 
in Argentine politics, cutting a niche for the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo to later fill. 
Chapter Two will also provide an adjacently running chronological timeline via Naomi 
Klein. While Perón was attempting to appeal to the masses, the United States government 
was backing social and psychological experimentation in applying shocks to individuals 
and societies.  
In secret laboratories at McGill University and in public classrooms at The 
Chicago School of Economics, two separate veins of torture were being explored: 
electroshock therapy upon individuals as a way to remake personalities, and wide-scale 
disaster capitalism on regions and countries as a precursor to reforming (remaking, 
repatterning) economic policies. These variations of “the shock doctrine” set the stage for 
a violent military junta to overthrow the Argentine political and social order and 
implement neoliberal capitalism, undermining a forty-year trajectory of economic 
stability and a sense of pride in national identity. 
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Chapter Three will bring together the Argentine players with those from the 
United States. By exploring the factors that contributed to the Dirty War and the Dirty 
War itself, Chapter Three will begin to tell the story that Robert Cox was too traumatized 
to tell himself. This chapter examines the actual implementation of torture upon 
unwitting “patients,” i.e., those Argentines oppressed by a “sick” political and “dying” 
economic system. It is during this time that our journalist-protagonists encroach too 
closely upon the hidden transcripts of the junta-disaster capitalist regime and are 
disappeared.  
Chapter Four takes over during the silent period of Timerman, when Cox 
continued their journalistic quest for justice by working closely with the Mothers of the 
Plaza de Mayo. While Chapter Two demonstrates the national Argentine identity around 
Peronism, and Chapter Three examines the shift in sociopolitical factors that served as 
impetus for the evolution of this identity, Chapter Four is an examination of a 
collaboration of personal identities, i.e., the organization of the unified voices of the 
Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo.  
Chapter Five’s conclusion serves to bring together Timerman, Cox, Klein, and the 
Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo by chronicling the return of Timerman’s voice, which both 
sang in harmony with the ongoing political activity of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, 
as well as echoed the silence of a highly traumatized Robert Cox, and the post-traumatic 
effects of disaster capitalism upon a previously nationalized country. Chapter Five is the 
culmination of  nearly forty years of history, reiterating the backfire of forced disaster 
capitalism upon Argentina. Though Friedman’s Chicago Boys and the combined Proceso 
junta of Argentina attempted to shock Argentines on both a personal and national level in 
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hopes of erasing pre-existing nationalist, populist, socialist, and Peronist identities, this 
scheme failed; instead the disaster capitalists niched out a stage for the global 
presentation of an evolved Argentine superidentity—the identity surrounding the memory 
of the disappeared.  
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Chapter 2 
The Backstory: Peronism, Anti-Peronism, and Post-World War II Argentine Identities 
  
 25 
The Cult of (Anti-)Peronism as a Polarizing National Identity and the Introduction of 
Women to the Political Sphere 
 “Human rights” as a concept was not well articulated until the close of the 
Second World War. Following the violence of and apart from war, much of the globe had 
been physically and psychologically wrecked. Europe and the United States, the seats of 
Western democratic practice, initiated a platform of international discussion to define and 
adopt a set of policies that granted individuals and ethnic groups rights and freedoms, as 
well as to hold individual governments responsible for internal instances of injustice. By 
the 1950s, human rights monitoring entered a new phase, with nongovernmental 
organizations, NGOs, sprouting up globally in response to domestic and international 
issues. By the 1970s, human rights awareness entered its third phase, becoming an 
integral piece of international law, and paving the way for 2003’s implementation of the 
International Criminal Court, whose inherent purpose was to prosecute crimes against 
humanity. 
20
 
During the beginning of the global human rights discussion, Juan Domingo Perón 
rose to power for the first time in Argentina. Human rights were far from his agenda, for 
after all, “violence from above engenders violence from below.” Perón saw casualties as 
a necessary part of his military rule—on all sides of the political spectrum. Juan Perón, 
born in 1865 in a small town south of Buenos Aires, was educated in a German mission 
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International Human Rights (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 4. See also: 
Sumner B. Twiss, “History, Human Rights, and Globalization,” The Journal of 
Religious Ethics 32, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 41-43, http://0-
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www.jstor.org.wncln.wncln.org/stable/30045143 (accessed April 4, 2013).  
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military training school. Perón spent his education and uneventful early career learning 
how to appeal to people. Perón found it politically useful to identify as a jack-of-all-
trades, studying boxing, archery, skiing and horseback riding, as well as authoring five 
books. Following the Great War, Perón went on an army delegation to Germany and 
Italy, where he became transfixed with the oratory skills of Benito Mussolini. Fancying 
himself a Mussolini of sorts, Perón returned to Argentina’s political scene, freshly 
steeped in the nationalist culture of right-wing, pre-World War II Italian and German 
fascism. 
21
 
In the early 1940s, Perón served his country in the offices of labor secretary and 
vice president. His reforms, his nationalist spirit, and his pro-worker sentiments quickly 
converged into an identity strongly tied to populism.  Indeed, at the heart of Perón’s 
reforms was the redistribution of wealth in favor of the common man; his major political 
task of the time was settling labor disputes. Out of his work with those who controlled the 
capital and those who contributed labor, Perón came to advocate populism as a method of 
alleviating wealth inequity and growing the Argentine economy. 
22
 
Populism, which has many connotations, has been most succinctly defined as a 
workers’ movement designed to address inequalities, specifically of the allocation of 
property. Along with his emotional speeches and Mussolini-esque charm, Perón 
catapulted himself high into the upper echelons of political power. As vice president, 
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22 Jeremy Adelman, “Reflections on Argentine Labor and the Rise of Perón,” Bulletin 
of Latin American Research, 11, no. 3 (September 1992): 243, http://0-
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Perón condemned Argentina’s dependence on Great Britain’s imperialist teat. Perón’s 
populist spirit endeared him to working-class Argentines, but earned him many enemies 
among the upper class and the evolving middle class. 
23
 
By 1944 full-blown “Peronism” had evolved under the auspices of Vice President 
Perón. Peronism has been described as not necessarily being any political ideology at all; 
rather Peronism is Perón, and Perón has no inherently definitive principles, but plenty of 
random ideas and an infinite resource pool from which to consolidate and exert power. If 
facets of fascism appealed to Perón, which they did, he utilized them, the same way he 
employed a panoply of other political “isms” such as corporativism and nationalism as 
needed for his own success. Perón, the army colonel with great expectations, engendered 
thousands of avid supporters by simply being himself; he also made enemies the same 
way. 
24
  
Peronism can also be interpreted more concretely as “an ill-defined mélange of 
populism, personalism, and nationalism,” i.e., the inward-focused, perpetuating 
Argentine spirit of nationalism, compounded with the growing populism movement, 
swirled around the person of Juan Perón. Peronism simply provided a name for the new 
political identity that emerged out of pre-existing sentiments of nationalism, which 
pervaded and polarized Argentine politics for decades. Peronism drew the sharp indelible 
political line between populist anti-liberalism and anti-liberal modernism. Indeed, 
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Peronism evolved from pre-existing roots of Argentine nationalism and grew out of 
populism around the person of Perón. 
25
 
General Eduardo Avalos, president to Perón’s vicepresidency, grew fearful of 
Perón’s increasing popularity and political power. Fearing a coup, Avalos exiled his vice 
president to Martin Garcia, an island prison, Argentina’s equivalent to France’s Isle of 
Elba. During this exile, which spanned all of one week, Juan Perón’s girlfriend and 
political ally, movie actress Eva Duarte, known colloquially as “Evita,” utilized the 
technology of radio to deliver emotional, passionate speeches across the Argentine 
airwaves, rallying Peronists together in support of their wrongfully imprisoned leader. 
Workers and patriots organized at the behest of Evita’s charming insistence and flooded 
the main square of Perón’s prison, forcing the military government to release Juan   
Perón. 
26
 
In 1946, Perón who was newly married to Evita, ran for president and was 
democratically elected with fifty-four percent of the popular vote. The Peróns became 
Argentina’s first major political power couple, Juan, a strong and commanding military 
leader, and Eva ,an attractive and persuasive accoutrement to her husband’s authoritarian 
regime. Upon his election, Perón immediately began to execute modernized economic 
policies. Rather than selling raw materials abroad, as favored by the land-owning elites, 
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Perón implemented a form of developmentalism known as Import Substitution 
Industrialization, or the ISI model of economics. Perón turned the Argentine economic 
focus inward, developing technology and production from the inside out. By 1950 when 
Raúl Prebisch, the Southern Cone’s ISI champion, set up shop in the United Nations’ 
Economic Commission for Latin America in Santiago de Chile, Juan Perón was ahead of 
the game in implementing ISI policies within Argentina. Prebisch and Perón’s ISI 
developmentalism proved beneficial throughout the Southern Cone, and Perón made 
Argentina a glowing example of inward-focused economic policies in the region. 
27
  
With a frenzied enthusiasm, Perón invested public money into state highways and 
steel plants. Perón nationalized the country’s railroad system that had been built largely 
by investments from Great Britain. He redistributed wealth to pacify the demands of the 
previously ignored proletariats, who had for years been treated by the ruling class as little 
more than peasant workers or land serfs. By heavily taxing foreign-built technologies, 
Perón ensured that Argentines ceased importing washing machines and automobiles from 
the US and Europe; instead Argentines made these technologies themselves. A boom in 
metalworking and textile production led Argentina’s GDP to soar, with industry 
overtaking agriculture for the first time in history.  
The increases in government spending and the redistribution of wealth meant high 
rates of inflation. As Perón sought to “harmonize” an “organized community,” many 
workers applauded their new higher wages as a result of a growing GDP. Oligarchical 
                                                        
27
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money-holding families frowned at Perón’s economic reforms, which smacked of social 
upheaval and devalued their capital wealth. The ruling class stood to lose much, 
including cheap labor, and they mistrusted the populism that made Perón a friend to the 
average worker. Workers gladly took advantage of their improved statuses and enjoyed 
improved labor conditions. Between 1946 and 1949, real wages increased by thirty 
percent, with benefits adding an addition forty percent to workers’ complete 
compensation packages. 
28
  
Not all workers were pleased with Perón’s policies, however, including the 
higher-ups within labor organizations. Perón introduced both reforms and stipulations to 
laborers, modeled after Benito Mussolini’s Labor Code. Workers’ contracts had to be 
endorsed by the labor secretary, the government would collect and distribute all union 
funds, and strikes were expressly prohibited. Perón controlled the General Workers’ 
Confederation, increasing state control over labor and subsequently over the economy. 
29
 
In addition to alienating the ruling class and the higher echelons of labor, Perón 
also earned many enemies among the academic elites. The Peronist General University 
Confederation tightened controls over the university systems. Liberal academic analysis 
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of Perón’s policies led many university professors, writers, and journalists to label 
Perón’s Confederation as pseudo-fascist and undemocratic. During the tenure of Perón’s 
first presidency, the Argentine Society of Writers, SADE, which boasted an eclectic 
membership of liberals and nationalists, shifted from being an apolitical union of 
academics to being a starkly anti-Peronist, politically driven organization. SADE found 
itself, with many other members of the academic elites, in an anti-nacionalistamood. To 
preserve its best interests, SADE did not publicize its views, but devised a strategy of 
quiet dissent, quietly protesting and writing about the injustices Perón continually 
wreaked upon academics. From 1943 to 1946, 423 teachers were expelled from 
universities; 823 more resigned in protest. 
30
 
Elementary and secondary teachers, too, disapproved of Perón for his infusion of 
school curricula with heavily nationalist political propaganda. Educators, already part of 
well-socialized and organized union groups, disagreed with Perón’s methodologies of 
forced nationalization through education, if not his ideologies altogether. Teachers used 
Perón’s propagandist textbooks minimally, preferring to teach students other theories 
besides the “mass politics and the theory of the dominant majority” that pushed students 
towards sentiments of “intolerance and coercion.” Teachers played an important role 
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during the age of Perón in working within the tenents of Peronism in order to disseminate 
anti-Peronist ideals. 
31
  
In addition to Perón’s polarizing economic and political reforms, he implemented 
mass authoritarian social modifications, further undermining the power of the people and 
of the press. Perón reworked the judicial system and began to take over newspapers, 
filtering the public’s free access to information. Knowing that his enemies were many, 
Perón set out on a mission to seek out and squelch opposition. In the models of Benito 
Mussolini and Adolph Hitler, Perón set up a secret police, which numbered about 30,000. 
Clad in brown shirts like their Gestapo predecessors, these secret police agents used force 
and violence to silence dissenters, including military officers, government agents, and 
citizens making peaceful protests against Perón’s tactics of political, economic, and 
social “reforms.” Perón installed concentration camps in Patagonia to silence labor 
dissenters and other political objectors; many were tortured with cattle prods to force 
compliance and submission.
32
  
In 1949, Perón increased his demands upon his labor base. Absenteeism among 
workers had become normal under their new found unprecedented liberties. Increased 
wages combined with decreased production meant high inflation—a rate of fifty percent. 
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Real wages decreased by twenty percent from 1949 through 1955. Perón blamed the 
unions. When workers struck, the state police responded with brutal force. 
33
 
By 1949, in the midst of Perón’s erratic reforms, the balance within the political 
and economic spheres began to quake, and Perón turned to a group of unlikely allies: 
housewives. In an attempt to solidify his political power and cast his net of Peronism over 
a wider sector of society, Perón, with Eva on his arm, began utilizing women as political 
and economic allies. When Perón first took office, women counted for only twenty 
percent of the economically active contributors. By 1950 Perón had named product 
consumption as the Argentine housewife’s most important job, under the umbrella of her 
natural state of wife-and-motherhood. Though some women under Peronism did receive a 
formal education and/or work outside the home, most considered an occupation 
“transitory,” preferring to return to their primary domestic duties when the economy 
evened out. Hebe de Bonafini, an Argentine housewife, stated the consensus of the 
Argentine woman: “What did a woman want with an education? All she had to know was 
to wash iron and cook.” 
34
 
Perón empowered women within their homes by granting them suffrage, workers’ 
rights, and the ability to divorce their husbands. Women became increasingly active in 
politics; Eva Perón led the Feminine Branch of Perón’s powerful political party. 
Women’s activities in politics were politely considered personal; each woman made her 
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own political decisions based upon her personal preferences and her individual family. 
One woman, newly active in politics under Perón, commented that she was lucky to have 
a supportive husband, and that many women she knew were simply slaves to their 
domestic obligations. Though women had been granted many rights under Perón, 
tradition pervaded the average Argentine’s home, preferring women to remain in their 
natural, rightful place. 
35
 
Perón appealed to the traditional housewife via a series of propaganda pamphlets 
published by the government. By glorifying the woman’s role as full-time domestic 
keeper and “consummate economic decision-maker” of the Argentine family, these 
brochures instructed housewives on the correct way to run household accounts and gave 
advice on items for purchase at grocery stores. Perón understood that females—mothers 
and wives—were the deciding factors in household purchases; women dictated purchases 
from fruits and vegetables to textiles, books, and major appliances—all Argentine made, 
of course.
 36 
 
When Eva Perón died of ovarian cancer in 1952, Juan Perón’s authoritarianism 
only increased and his already-frequent usage of violence escalated. Perón went as far as 
to publically encourage citizens to utilize violence against other citizens who attempted to 
stand against Peronist reforms or his henchmen. Perón exercised his bulging political 
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muscles by expelling two dissenting Catholic priests; Pope Pius XII responded by 
excommunicating Perón. 
37
 
Unfavorable responses to Peronism grew in the public sector and within Perón’s 
own military. Journalists like Jacobo Timerman accused Peron of changing daily based 
upon what the people who he ruled wished—or did not wish—him to be. Timerman 
studied Perón’s documents and political actions, finding each to contradict the other. 
Timerman and his colleagues disagreed with Peron’s political reforms and found them, 
along with his cult of person based upon that of Benito Mussolini, to be anti-Semetic. 
Timerman believed that Perón’s labor heads were too young and inexperienced, which 
made them easily manipulated by the strong leader. Robert Cox, Timerman’s colleague 
and a quiet family man, associated Perón with violence. Neither journalist had much 
good to say about the populist president. 
38
 
Citizen guerrilla groups began forming in response to oppressive policies and 
increased state violence, utilizing violence to fight violence. Military leaders planned to 
overthrow Perón in 1955 in response to his cutting the military budget and his infusion of 
Peronist propaganda into the military academies of Argentina. After a two-week standoff, 
the military coup was complete. Perón was sent again into exile. General Pedro Eugenio 
Aramburu, Argentina’s new de facto president, declared Peronism illegal; he even 
outlawed the public usage of the words “Perón” or “Peronism.” Citizens who publically 
stood for Perón were sent to prison and/or executed in favor of moving past Perón’s still-
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strong political hold. However, even in exile, Perón remained popular with many 
working-class Argentines; the seeds of Peronism had been planted and continued to 
flourish, even in the great man’s absence. 
39
 
The “loyalties…illusions…and habits” of Peronism had indeed infiltrated society. 
In the absence of their revered leader, Peronists continued crediting their exiled hero with 
Argentina’s ability to weather economic hardships, keep a lid on inflation, and carry out 
the demands and needs of the proletariat. Though the new post- Perón military junta 
hated the ideals Perón left behind and attempted to remove all Peronists from the ranks of 
the military, public office, and union leadership, the cult of Peron could not be that easily 
erased from Argentina’s national identity. In the 1957 election, Peronists left their ballots 
blank as a form of nonviolent protest. Perón, a candidate who was not even on the ballot, 
captured two million blank ballots—one-quarter of the total ballots cast. The memory of 
Perón contributed to the power of identity. Even in Perón’s political absence, Peronism 
and anti-Peronism as national political identities remained strong. 
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The Development of Shock Torture in the 1950s as a Precursor to Changes in Identity 
Gail Kastner suffered from a faulty memory. As an adult, she was plagued with 
extreme physical pain, an inexplicable fear of electricity, and severe anxiety and 
depression. Kastner overate and smoked continually. She spent most of her time in a 
convalescent home, adjusting her recliner and making notes on scraps of paper and in 
empty cigarette boxes.
41
  
While Juan Perón ruled Argentina during the 1950s, Kastner, a teenager in 
Canada, lived with her identical twin sister in a home with a psychologically abusive 
father. Late in her teenage years she sought psychiatric therapy to deal with anxiety from 
her troubled home life. Kastner, an eighteen-year-old nursing student at McGill 
University in Montreal, visited Dr. Ewen Cameron, a well-known psychiatrist out of the 
Allan Memorial Institute of her university. 
42
 
When Gail checked in for her in-patient therapy, Dr. Cameron recorded that she 
seemed to be a “reasonably well-balanced individual.” After months of experimental 
treatments for depression and anxiety, Dr. Cameron’s diagnosis was drastically different; 
he labeled Kastner as “schizophrenic.” Dr. Cameron’s staff nurses charted that Kastner, 
who had entered treatment as a cheerful and social girl, entered a phase of manipulation 
and aggression before finally ending her treatments under the labels “passive and 
despondent.” When Kastner was released she could count only as high as six and could 
not recognize photographs of her immediate family. She sucked her thumb and 
demonstrated other infantile tendencies. She was no longer the upbeat, intelligent nursing 
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student who simply needed to work through daddy issues. She was emotionally, 
psychologically, and physically broken. 
43
 
Kastner was not Dr. Ewen Cameron’s only patient, and Dr. Cameron was an 
innocuous psychiatrist. Dr. Cameron, who had served as the head of the psychiatric 
boards of Canada, the United States, and the world, used his patients as guinea pigs for 
experimental trauma-inducing therapy. Patients who needed basic psychiatric assistance 
for issues like marital problems and post-partum depression visited Dr. Cameron’s 
facility where he oversaw their “therapy,” which consisted of long-term isolation, high-
voltage electroshock treatments, long periods of forcibly induced sleep, and the 
administration of drug cocktails, which included PCP and LSD. Patients who refused 
these bizarre treatments were injected with sedatives and forced to comply. Cameron’s 
goal was to violently and traumatically destroy his patients’ mental facilities in attempts 
to rebuild them into healthy, productive citizens. 
44
  
All these excessive, experimental treatments were designed to create in patients’ 
brains a tabla rasa, a clean slate, upon which reprogramming and personality 
reconstruction could be possible. “Psychic driving,” or the “repatterning” of a personality 
following “depatterning,” followed the brainwashing; patients listened to taped messages 
on repeat for hours a day, day after day, telling them they were good parents, good 
people, and productive citizens. Though Dr. Cameron’s attempts to erase memories and 
regress patients to a docile, malleable state proved somewhat successful, the rebuilding of 
new personalities and the forced implementation of modified behavior patterns was 
unequivocally not. Once patients had been severely traumatized, Dr. Cameron was unable 
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to repattern them. Psychic driving was not successful as a therapeutic treatment, but that 
did not deter the good doctor from continuing experiments and taking the “therapy” in 
another direction. 
45
  
With the Cold War waging, the United States sought ways to deter communist 
brainwashing in soldiers in Korea, as well as formulate techniques to interrogate Russian 
spies and cross agents. Under the code name MKUltra, Dr. Cameron and his professional 
colleagues at forty-four universities and twelve hospitals across the United States and 
Canada were granted $25 million by the United States C.I.A. to research “special 
interrogation techniques,” i.e., to administer violent physically and psychically damaging 
shocks upon unwitting victims in hopes they would release sensitive information. 
46
 
While Cameron’s early patients like Kastner had received multiple electroshock 
treatments and had been subjected to extreme sensory deprivation and extensive 
psychoactive drug cocktails, Cameron’s new research executed 360 shocks per patient 
over time, and patients were kept asleep in horse stalls converted to isolation chambers 
for twenty-plus hours at a time for up to one month. Cameron’s goals were simple but 
terrifying—to erase sensory input and to erase memory—the two integral techniques in 
correctly applying torture to a victim. Cameron and his cohorts researched other varying 
techniques of physical and emotional torture no longer to rebuild personalities, but rather 
to ascertain the best ways to break down suspected spies and double agents and obtain 
information from them against their wills: torture. 
47
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 While Dr. Ewen Cameron spent the 1950s experimenting with the administration 
of physical and psychic shocks to individuals, Professor Milton Friedman of the Chicago 
School of Economics passed the decade philosophizing upon the value of broad-scale 
economic shocks to permit a tabla rasa in society at large to foster the implementation of 
unfettered capitalism.  Both the doctor and the professor shared similar ideologies and 
methodologies: depatterning individuals/societies and wiping the individual/collective 
memory in favor of repatterning. For Cameron, repatterning meant personalities; for 
Friedman, repatterning meant replacing encumbered economic systems with unregulated, 
unfettered capitalism. 
48
 
Both men proposed that the only way to reprogram individuals and society was by 
repeatedly shocking them. However, Friedman’s “bitter medicine” could not be 
administered as freely as Dr. Cameron’s. In fact, he realized that he would either have to 
wait for a traumatic event such as a war or a flood—or he would have to create one in 
order to test his theories. While Cameron had a C.I.A.-funded laboratory, Friedman 
waited anxiously until he, too, could have his own laboratory setting to test his theories of 
disaster capitalism, that is, the forced implementation of laissez-faire capitalism 
following a traumatic event. 
49
 
Friedman spent the next twenty years hypothesizing and settling to study 
complicated mathematical equations and to present persuasively capitalist lectures. He 
waited until the 1970s to finally get the chance to instigate his own series of societal 
shocks and implement neoliberal capitalism. Biding time by fighting the tenents of 
Keynesian economics, which balanced capitalism with governmental interventions and 
                                                        
48 Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, 42-43, 47. 
49 Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, 60. 
 41 
social programs, Friedman and his “Chicago Boys” carried their ideologies through the 
Cold War, preserving and augmenting them until the time was right for their 
implementation.
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Argentine Identities Outside of and After (Anti-)Peronism 
 Citizens of Argentina identified themselves based on any number of criteria: 
political stances, religious affiliations, familial associations, and professional networks to 
name a few. This paper has explained the effects of Peronisn and anti-Peronism on the 
political and economic landscape of post-World War II Argentina, but many Argentines 
during the time of Peronism would have described themselves as apolitical, wanting 
nothing to do with the political binaries that were violently dividing their country.  
Though there are many identities that Argentines aligned themselves with, this 
portion of the paper will focus on the identity factors of Jacobo Timerman and Robert 
Cox that affected their political actions and directly influenced their need to transmit 
memory: their identity as journalist, and their identity surrounding activism, spurred by 
duty and faith.
51
 By examining the two journalists’ personal lives, this section will create 
the backdrop for the political identities of two men who reported and editorialized upon 
the Argentine identity at large as a way to underscore the overlapping factors that 
contributed to identity formations prior to the Dirty War.  
Jacobo Timerman in his memoir Prisoner Without a Name, Cell Without a 
Number identifies himself first and foremost as a Jew. Beyond his Judaism, his identity 
was closely tied to being both a family man and a career journalist. Timerman’s 
adulthood profession, family, and faith were offshoots of a traumatic childhood 
influenced by chaotic European interwar politics, immigration into poverty, 
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indoctrination into religious zealotry, and the demand for truth in memory, influenced by 
his mother, the matriarch of the Timerman family.  
An instrumental event in the formation of Timerman’s identity occurred in his 
childhood. In 1933, five years after his family’s arrival to Argentina, a ten-year-old 
Jacobo Timerman wished to dress up as a clown as part of the country’s popular Carnival 
festivities. Children and adults would wear costumes to participate in parades to celebrate 
the season before Lent—a Christian tradition. Energy was high as citizens looked to the 
celebration to distract them from the worsening conditions of the political economy.  
But the Timermans were not Christian, and Yankle, the Yiddish for Jacobo, was 
disappointed in his mother’s refusal to allow him to participate in an “anti-Semitic” 
celebration, which she claimed served only to further ostracize the non-Christian 
members of Argentine society. Costumes as such represented the facelessness of Jews, 
dispersed across the world with no home country of their own. Mrs. Timerman instilled 
in her son the identity of an outsider, of the other. Timerman felt the pangs of perceived 
persecution as his mother suggested her young son wait for Purim, an acceptable time for 
honorable people dress up as influential historical figures such as Tolstoy or Herzel.  
“You’ll wear a beautiful beard…And you’ll recite words from some of the books 
they’ve written,” said his mother to encourage her disappointed son. 
 “But everyone will laugh at me,” Jacobo said, disappointed, thinking of the 
exciting, funny, and colorful costumes his friends would be wearing. His mother 
responded that only goyim will laugh, for Jews have greater respect for intelligent people 
than Christians. 
 Jacobo vocalized his frustrations: “Mother, why do they hate us?”  
 44 
“Because they don’t understand,” his mother replied. 
52
 
At this moment in his youth, Jacobo felt his first (recurring) pang of confusion, 
ostracism, isolation, and judgment of being different, marginalized, and misunderstood.   
The early sentiments of Jacobo’s mother echoed throughout his later writing, creating in 
the small boy the identity of God’s chosen outsider. Over the course of his life, the word 
“Jew” would serve as his scarlet letter, his yellow star, the almost-tangible moniker of his 
ever-evolving identity--bequeathed proudly to him by his mother, the woman who made 
sure Yankle understood who he really was. Timerman’s Jewish identity had been in the 
making since before his birth, handed to him via the matrilineal line of Judaism by the 
parent whose voice echoed in his head for the rest of his life, resounding and reaffirming 
his religious, social, and political identity: his mother explained that Jacobo was different; 
Jacobo was a Jew.
53
 
Throughout Jacobo Timerman’s formative teenage years, his mother reinforced 
his Judaism by enrolling him in a Zionist sports club called Macabi. In 1935, Mr. 
Timerman passed away. Mrs. Timerman kept her children busy attending Hebrew school 
and working odd jobs to support their family. The following year, Jews like the 
Timermans in Argentina and around the world glued their attentions to the news of the 
1936 Berlin Olympics. Adolph Hitler claimed his Aryan army of German athletes would 
crucify Jews and persons of color in the athletic arenas. The world watched Hitler’s 
Aryan army fall short of Herr Führer’s lofty expectations. Jews scattered around the 
world thought perhaps, as a group, they could finally be understood, contextualized, and 
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proved worthy. Timerman himself thought perhaps, with enough empirical evidence of 
validity, Jews would be accepted by “Christians” and amalgamated seamlessly into 
society. This amalgamation did not occur as the Timermans had hoped.
54
 
Jacobo’s mother was very pleased when, at age fourteen, Jacobo joined Avuca 
(Hebrew for “torch”), a highly political Zionist club for Jewish youths. Each Shabbat 
after Temple, Jacobo would scrub the floors or the family’s apartment buildings and, 
following a quick trip to the public bath, attend Avuca with his older brother Joseph.  The 
youths acclimated to their new group of friends by playing chess and Ping-Pong, 
novelties to the poor, sheltered Timermans. They discussed with their wealthy, educated 
new friends the long and tempestuous history of their people, and the potential for a 
positive future for Jews in Argentina and around the world. Jacobo picked up scouting 
and the art of debate, under the tutelage of guest lecturers from the University Zionist 
Atheneum. His newly acquired identity of Zionist set the teenage Jacobo on a trajectory.  
He began learning the depths and breadth of Judaism, and the depths and breadth of his 
own political identity, connecting the microcosm to the macrocosm, and putting his own 
Jewish faith into the context of Catholic Argentina.
55
 
Avuca meetings provided Timerman with the proverbial lens to examine himself 
and his people. In fact, Mr. Jacobo Timerman retrospectively credited the Avuca club as 
being the catalyst for his entire world changing. Suddenly a poor, confused, socially 
marginalized Jew was able to place himself into the global perspective. Jacobo learned to 
be “different,” but not alone. Avuca taught Jacobo that being “different” could work as an 
advantage rather than a disadvantage. Jacobo learned to take back a name with a negative 
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connotation based upon a binary label like “other” or “Jew,” and to embrace it, accept it, 
and create a new identity around it. His mother was no doubt proud of his burgeoning 
Judaism. Timerman’s faith, ignited out of the flames of anti-Semitism by his mother’s 
match, led him on a life-long conquest of identity and purpose. 
56
 
Timerman and his young Zionist comrades marched, picketed, and fist-fought 
fascists and anti-Semites in the Buenos Aires streets. Rather than kowtowing to the social 
stigma of the label “Jew,” he focused his Judaism into activism. This transition of energy, 
sparked by Mrs. Timerman, gave Jacobo Timerman, even in his youth, a strong voice 
against the growing sanctions of fascism that threatened Europe, Latin America, and the 
globe. The undercurrents of preserving memory and traditions permeated into 
Timerman’s education and professional life. When he entered school and graduated as a 
journalist, his primary focus for reporting the news was to ensure that the underdog was 
given a voice. Timerman focused his career on truth in memory; his entire identity was 
molded around the preservation of the uniqueness of identity. 
57
 
The lifetime formulation of such a Jewish identity clashed over time with the 
“virulently intolerant version of Catholicism” that Argentina developed under long 
periods of Spanish and Italian influence. This forceful type of Christianity was introduced 
to Argentine politics in the 1930s, but would not come to fruition until the 1960s and 
1970s. These religious overtones were, however, more deeply rooted in the authoritarian 
regime’s desire to implement neoliberal economic policies—policies that true liberals of 
politics and economics would have little respect for. Therefore Jews were thrown with 
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young professionals and university students into the ever-widening net of dissenters and 
subversives to be targeted and disappeared. 
58
 
Robert Cox arrived in Argentina in 1955, just in time to catch the early waves of 
post- Perón Peronism. Cox was born in England, and made no claims to be deeply 
religious in any faith. Cox’s religion seemed rather his sense of duty, which he carried 
with him throughout his life as a simple motto: do your job; report the truth. This 
sentiment arose during Cox’s formative years in Great Britain. Cox worked in the news 
business since age fourteen when he signed up for a paper route to augment his family’s 
income upon his father’s untimely death. In addition to delivering news, the young boy 
showed a knack for reporting writing and was soon put on the payroll of the East Essex 
Gazette composing obituaries. 
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Before his journalistic career could take off, Cox was drafted into the Korean 
War, served two years in the Navy, and earned two medals before returning to Great 
Britain. Upon his return to his homeland of England, Cox took up a post at the Anglican 
Daily Times and the Hull Daily Mail. Cox had a penchant for covering dangerous stories, 
and, as a reporter, made the news himself when he ran into a building engulfed in flames 
to rescue those left trapped in a fire. 
60
 
Cox’s sense of duty sprang from his upbringing. His father had served in World 
War I and was greatly disappointed when old age prohibited him from serving again in 
World War II. Influenced by his father’s loyalty to service and country, Bob Cox put his 
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heart into his own military service, and subsequently to his quest to bring truth to the 
readers of the news journals for which he wrote. “Do your job; report the truth,” repeated 
Cox. Unlike Jacobo Timerman, who was a motivated activist prodded by religious faith 
and a sense of inequality, Cox’s sense of duty was more even-keeled and analytical. 
Though he covered the strongly Catholic Argentine politics and expressed his views on 
the anti-Semitic climate of Argentina following World War II and into the Dirty War, 
Cox’s activism was thoroughly applied across the delineating lines of race, religion, and 
creed. 
While Timerman both embraced and undermined the political climate of his 
adopted homeland of Argentina, Cox gave his own opinions as sojourner, an English-
speaker in a sea of Spanish-language commentary. Timerman, who wrote highly 
emotional appeals, was greatly a product of growing up feeling like an outsider in his 
adopted homeland; Robert Cox, the eternal English gentleman, printed news with the 
unique point of view of an insider-observer rather than a participant. While both 
journalists described themselves as more centric than right or left, Timerman admitted his 
newspaper, La Opinión, was understood to be liberal, and Cox, who identified as 
conservative, found himself defending the Herald’s editors from being labeled as 
“bleeding heart liberals.” Neither man approved of or related well to Perón and the 
negative, polarizing effects of Peronism upon Argentina. Both men resented his political 
reforms and the subsequent hyper-Catholic reforms of the Proceso junta. 
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Both journalists lost their fathers as boys, and found themselves hard at work at 
young ages to support their mothers and remaining family members. Timerman’s father 
passed when he was twelve years old, Cox’s when he was fourteen. Both young men 
developed close ties with their young families, which carried over into their positions in 
their homes as loyal husbands and fathers to the families they created as grown men. 
Both men worked hard as business professionals to fulfill their personal obligations and 
their roles within their families. Both men cared deeply for their wives and children, and 
made many of their political and professional decisions based upon the image of their 
wives’ eyes or simply to protect their children’s safety. Both men received hundreds of 
other people’s mothers into their offices from the time (anti-)Peronist violence began well 
into the days of the Dirty War’s disappearance of thousands of citizens. 
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Perón’s Absent but Violent Effects over Argentina 
Following the ousting of Perón in 1955, weak military and civilian rule became a 
ten-year plague in Argentina. As Peronism had been made illegal, Peronists found 
themselves working outside of the regular constitutional means in order to make their 
political and economic demands heard. Direct action and labor militancy became the 
modus operandi of the Peronists, who utilized violence as a means of communication. 
63
 
A(nother) coup d’état of 1966 replaced a tenuous radical government with the 
most authoritarian military junta known to Argentina up to that time. The new Argentine 
president, General Juan Carlos Onganía, implemented his own personal reforms to 
Argentine society. Onganía was a professing member of the Opus Dei, a devout sect of 
Catholicism. Onganía stocked his cabinet with Opus Dei brothers. Stark, militantly 
traditional Catholicism permeated the government, even after Onganía was deposed. 
These Catholic patriarchs found universities and trade unions to be rife with liberals, 
specifically Jews, which was a problem for the tenents of tradition and faith the 
authoritarian government wished to propagate throughout society. These Catholic rulers 
viewed liberals, universities, and Jews as part of a larger “Zionist Conspiracy.” 
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Beyond religious reform, Onganía made it his primary purpose to modernize the 
economic system. Onganía set about this goal by eradicating citizens from active 
participation in government and further weakening the power of labor. Onganía 
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disbanded Congress, dismantled the political party system, and met all forms of 
opposition with intimidation and violence. The workers’ right to strike was again 
withdrawn as Onganía froze wages and eliminated thousands of public railroad and 
airport jobs. 
65
 
Union workers like Augusto Vandor of the Unión Obrera Metalúrgica, or 
Metallurgical Workers Union, were quite disgruntled by Onganía’s oppressive social, 
economic, and political policies. In hopes of recreating the alliance that had existed 
between labor and the military under Perón, on March 1, 1967, Vandor and his followers, 
dubbed vandoristas, went on an illegal strike to leverage their demands. General Onganía 
responded by criminalizing six of Argentina’s leading trade unions and suspending all 
collective bargaining. 
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Six thousand workers and students in Cordoba, Tucuman City, and Buenos Aires, 
appalled at Onganía’s tactics, broke out into riots. In a vein reminiscent of Peronist-
approved violence, demonstrators overturned police cars and set almost 200 shops on 
fire. Onganía responded forcefully, sending airborne troops to Cordoba and imposing 
martial law. By the time the demonstrations died down, at least ten Argentines were 
killed, including one in a bomb, which exploded at police headquarters in Buenos Aires. 
Four hundred Argentines were reported as injured, and five hundred were arrested. This 
event, which became known as “Cordobazo,” radicalized and mobilized right-wing 
Peronists as well as leftist workers, university students, and young professionals in a 
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manner popularized under Peronism but with a renewed vengeance against the oppressive 
and authoritarian military rule. 
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The “Cordobazo” set a precedent for the Argentine populace responding to 
government oppression.  Many Argentines, whether political or not, whether Peronist or 
not, took to Perón’s sentiment of violence as an appropriate response to violence, and 
Argentines began responding in kind to their increasingly violent government and to one 
another. Out of such labor disputes like the Codobazo, a guerrilla group called the 
“Montoneros” arose from a much larger Peronist labor base. Though Peronist leaders 
outside of the leftist Montoneros disputed the terrorist tactics of the guerrilla group and 
publically denounced the wayward faction, the Montoneros exercised their underground 
political strength to combat the oppression of their government in any way they saw fit—
mostly by utilizing violence. 
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Other leftist guerrilla groups opposed to the oppressive military regimes formed, 
as well such as the Revolutionary Army of the People, ERP, a group created in homage to 
revolutionary Ernesto “Che” Guevara, and the Revolutionary Party of the Workers, PRT. 
A “class-conscious” unionism formed out of university students, young professionals, 
and liberal Catholic clergy, not associated with Peronism but made possible by the veins 
of Peronism that already existed in Argentina. A shift in Argentine identities occurred as 
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citizens began organizing around political identities that no longer solely focused on the 
polarizing effects of Perón, but rather upon an increasing need for justice under 
increasingly oppressive, authoritarian government controls. 
69
  
In 1971 Jacobo Timerman, aware of the growing political oppression around him, 
formed La Opinión, Argentina’s only completely reader-supported, advertisement-free 
newspaper. A political journalist with twenty-four years of experience in newspapers, 
magazines, radio, and television, Timerman set up his moderate- to left-leaning 
newspaper as a means to deliver truth when the military regimes of his country began 
buying and controlling news. La Opinión was censured on several occasions by the 
political powers of the time, including by Isabel Perón, the new wife of Juan Perón, who 
returned with him to the Argentine presidency.
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When Perón returned to the seat of Argentine power in 1973, the use of state-
sponsored terrorism in response to citizen-initiated violence (which was a response to 
governmental authoritarianism) had become shockingly “normal.” At this time Perón 
formed the Triple A, the Argentine Anticommunist Alliance, a guerrilla group, which 
consisted of military and police officials, formed to combat other existing guerrilla 
factions. Many members of the Triple A were ex-police and ex-military with besmirched 
records of conduct; many had committed crimes while in service. The Triple A used 
disappearances as a means to identify and forcefully squelch alleged terrorists and 
subversives. Much to the dismay of Jacobo Timerman, the Triple A obtained funds from 
powerful Jewish community leaders, as well as by extortion, blackmailing five hundred 
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Argentine companies in exchange for not disappearing their employees. The 
Anticommunist Alliance was as successful as the Montoneros in such extortion; the 
Montoneros blackmailed the same five hundred Argentinean companies for identical 
reasons. 
71
 
Bob Cox wrote articles and editorials foreshadowing and forewarning the 
escalation of violence from both above and below. Perón’s words “Violence from above 
engenders violence below” echoed throughout government halls, business offices, private 
homes, secret hideouts, and in Cox’s head. Cox and Timerman printed their 
condemnation for the use of violence from the government and the guerrilla groups. In a 
1974 editorial covering the murder of the three police officers by “terrorists,” Cox begged 
his readers to consider the growing numbers widow(er)s and orphans left behind as 
violence incited more violence. Cox argued and pleaded: 
Criminal action is not a legitimate form of political protest any 
more than brutal repression of dissident opinion is acceptable as a 
means of maintaining public order. If only the quiet voice of the 
civilized conscience of the ordinary person could make itself heard, we 
might see an end to the violence.
72
   
 
A near end to violence was not in sight for Argentina. A year after he formed the 
Triple A, Juan Perón died, leaving his wife Isabel to rule his now-chaotic homeland of 
Argentina. During Isabel’s tenuous reign, Argentina’s military forces joined with Chile’s 
DINA, the National Intelligence Directorate, which operated under the auspices of 
Operation Condor, an organization of military governments that violently utilized a 
highly classified information network to squelch the ever-growing, ever-strengthening 
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guerilla groups of the Southern Cone. By joining ranks with Operation Condor, the 
military of Argentina exponentially increased its resources, manpower, and knowledge 
base. 
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The United States CIA, fully practiced on shocking interrogation techniques from 
its years of Cold War experiments under Dr. Ewan Cameron, sent both funds and agents 
to train Southern Cone Operation Condor officials on proper methods of detention and 
torture. With such limitless access to information, the Argentine junta justified grouping 
all “subversives” into the category of violent guerillas. Anyone who opposed the military 
was considered a dangerous terrorist and was hunted down, captured, and handled as 
such. By 1975 the Argentine death count was at 475 bodies: guerrillas, police officers, 
government officials, leftist citizens, and even innocent children and bystanders had lost 
their lives to political terrorism. Along with an increased body count, inflation in the 
Argentine economy exploded under Perón’s expansionary monetary policy. By the coup 
d’état of 1976, which ousted Isabel Perón, the economy of Argentina was in decline, and 
a pattern of citizen and state-sponsored violence had been fully established. “The Dirty 
War” was in full swing. 
74
 
  
                                                        
73 John Dinges, The Condor Years: How Pinochet and His Allies Brought Terrorism to 
Three Continents (New York: The New Press, 2005), 135-136. See also: Cox, Dirty 
Secrets, Dirty War, Kindle edition.  
74 Marina Franco and Carlos Pérez, “Between Urgency and Strategy: Argentine Exiles 
in Paris, 1976-1983,” 52. See also: John Dinges, The Condor Years: How Pinochet and 
His Allies Brought Terrorism to Three Continents (New York: The New Press, 2005), 
135-136. See also: Cox, Dirty Secrets, Dirty War, Kindle edition; Isabel Sanz Villarroya, 
“Macroeconomic Outcomes and the Relative Position of Argentina's Economy, 1875–
2000,” Journal of Latin American Studies 41, no. 2 (May 2009): 328 
http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0022216X09005586 (accessed April 3, 2012).  
 
 
 56 
Chapter 3 
The Implementation of Neoliberalism and the Dirty War: The Beginning of Shifts 
Upon the Identity of the Disappeared 
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The Dirty War Through the Perspective of Two Political Journalists 
Jacobo Timerman and Robert Cox were somewhat confused following the coup 
d’état of 1976. The bloody battles surrounding Peronism, including the guerrilla facets of 
right and left and the state’s response to terrorism, had truly gone out of control in 
Argentina. Both journalists realized something drastic had to occur to stop the violence. 
They observed the surprisingly bloodless coup of 1976 as it installed a combined junta of 
the army, navy, and air force under the rule of Army Commander General Jorge Videla: 
the National Reorganization Process, or Proceso regime. The coup had been efficient and 
free of casualties. 
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 Argentine citizens, who had grown tired of the political and economic unrest of 
the past decade(s), were pleasantly relieved when de facto President Videla assumed 
Isabel Perón’s presidency seat. Unlike the horrendously violent military overthrow in 
Chile that ejected democratically elected Salvador Allende and placed dictator Augusto 
Pinochet in office in 1973, the Argentine coup of 1976 that installed the Proceso seemed 
to promise a return to order from the chaos of Peronism-gone-wild. Citizens all over 
Argentina were hopeful that Videla would end the political chaos and polarization that 
had ignited around the cult of Perón.
76
 
Bob Cox had covered many coups d'état during his tenure as an Argentine 
reporter in the 1960s and 1970s. Directly following the junta’s military takeover, Cox 
praised General Videla, calling him a dove among hawks. The Herald announced Videla 
was just the man to end terrorism, stop corruption, and reinstate democracy in Argentina. 
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As an economic conservative, Cox was also excited by the installation of the free market 
economy Videla put in place. “Once we get the economy right, the rest will follow,” Cox 
was known to repeat. 
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  A week later, Cox came home very late. Waking his wife, Maud, he voiced his 
burgeoning concerns: “I’m very worried. Things are not going as we hoped. It looks as if 
our worst fears are coming true…the killing hasn’t stopped. People are still 
disappearing.” 
78
 
 Jacobo Timerman came to this realization simultaneously but independently. 
Days after the fall of Isabel Perón, Timerman had lunch at his favorite swanky club in the 
basement of the Plaza Hotel of downtown Buenos Aires. His luncheon guest was a naval 
officer of the Argentine military forces. Timerman never named the man—perhaps the 
man never gave his name—but the officer put the “civil war against subversives” into 
grave perspective for the seasoned journalist.  
 The unnamed officer confided to Timerman that two days earlier, directly 
following the coup, someone had poisoned the lunches of several high-ranking military 
officers. The officers had not eaten the food, but the attempt on their lives was to be taken 
seriously, nonetheless. Timerman remarked, “It was obviously the guerrillas. I’d submit 
them to military law and aim for a public trial, inviting journalists and foreign jurists to 
attend.”  
The unnamed officer asked Timerman what the point of that would be. Timerman 
explained that a trial would uncover the motives and methodology of the guerrillas, 
exposing their secrets to the country, and putting an end to the romanticized version of 
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revolution that enshrined the rebels. The officer informed Timerman that no trial had 
taken place, but the would-be poisoners had already been executed. 
 “Without trial, defense, or anyone’s knowledge?” Timerman asked, appalled. 
 “Had we followed the method you advise, we would have had to delay their 
execution after they’d been sentenced to death.” 
 “Why?” 
 “Because the Pope would have intervened,” responded the officer, nonchalantly. 
 Timerman asked if it would not be preferable to simply reject the Pope’s petition 
rather than undermine the entire system of political process. “All that you’d be 
accomplishing, once this phase is over, is a resurgence of vengeance and violence. The 
seeds of future violence are being planted,” Timerman argued. 
 “You’re a Jew and don’t understand that we can’t deny a petition from the Holy 
Father…that’s why a political defeat is necessary,” the officer retorted. “…[I]f we 
exterminate them all, there’ll be fear for several generations.” 
 Timerman asked carefully, “What do you mean by all?” 
 The officer responded, “All…about twenty thousand people. And their relatives, 
too—they must be eradicated—and also those who remember their names…not a trace or 
witness will remain.” 
 Timerman said to the nameless officer, “That’s what Hitler attempted in his Night 
and Fog policy. Sending to their death, reducing to ashes and smoke, those he’d already 
stripped of any human trace or identity. Germany paid for each and every one of them. 
And is still paying, with a nation that has remained divided.” 
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 The officer’s response was simple: “Hilter lost the war. We will win.”
79
 
 Timerman was stunned. His identity hung in a balance—he wanted to believe that 
peace had been returned to his adopted homeland, but this military official informed him 
not only that the violence was just beginning, but that Timerman, a Jew, would never 
understand the reasoning and depths behind the Catholic influenced military’s decision to 
identify and eradicate all perceived subversives, their families, and anyone who would 
even remember their names. Indeed most Argentines had no idea what was bubbling 
below the surface of the National Reorganization Process.
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 Days later, Videla and his Proceso regime censured the press, issuing a “list of 
principles and procedures” for editors to enforce. Cox scoffed off the list; the Argentine 
constitution forbade such a censorship of the press. Cox gravely printed that in less than a 
week following the coup, twenty-six bodies had been recovered, burned, blown up, and 
covered in bullet holes. Cox continued to print the names of the disappeared and the 
body count. 
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 On April 22, 1976, the junta issued a statement reiterating and strengthening the 
censorship of the press: 
 As from today it is forbidden to report, comment on or make reference to 
subversive incidents, the appearance of bodies and the deaths of subversive 
elements and/or members of the security forces unless they are first 
announced by a responsible official source. This includes kidnappings and 
disappearances.
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 Along with the censorship of the press came the junta’s campaign to return 
Argentina to traditional Catholic values. Pre-existing Catholic factions, leftover from 
years of Italian and Spanish influence, placed into prominence during the tenure of Juan 
Carlos Onganía, gripped tightly on the highest echelons of the Argentine political 
spheres. Networks of Catholic friends and family members formed informal links 
between members of government and Catholic universities. Those running the campaigns 
of terror associated the threat to Argentina’s future with universities, the media, and with 
liberal politics—all fields allegedly dominated by Jews. 
83
 
Loyal nationalist clergymen preached publically and in their own private circles 
of the need to return to traditional Christian values, and how the laws of God took 
precedence over the laws of state. If God were displeased with the subversives, they must 
be eradicated, in the manner of the crusades or the Inquisition. Catholic priests often 
visited torture cells and administered last rights to dying prisoners; they pardoned 
torturers and assured the perpetrators of violence that God’s will was done in their 
shocking actions. Many torturers cited the calming words of their priests as they prepared 
to exact physical and psychological torture on alleged subversives.
84
  
Infamous priest Father von Wenich assured a troubled guard that God knew that 
the purging actions of torture were good for the country. Von Wernich was later indicted 
for seven murders, forty-two abductions, and thirty-one instances of torture. Father Sosa, 
a detention camp priest, insisted that prison guards should think of themselves as 
surgeons eradicating an evil disease. Bishop Medina preached to military troops and 
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torturers, advising them to point their swords in the right direction—towards the impure 
subversives. The National Commission on the Disappeared, CONADEP, corroborates 
the testimonies of numerous released disappeared persons who witnessed active and 
passive abuses by Catholic clergymen. 
85
  
With the resurgence of militant Catholicism came a return to patriarchy. Any 
political strides that women had made under decades past seemed to fade quickly as 
women were encouraged to return to their homes and abandon all political aspirations. 
The misogynist junta insisted women had no place outside the home. Many women with 
disappeared husbands and children had no political allies to turn to, so they turned to 
their priests. Although some priests were liberally minded and desired to help the women, 
others like Fathers von Wernich and Sosa remained in the pocket of the government. 
Hebe de Bonafini, an uneducated housewife and the mother of a disappeared son, went to 
see Monsignor Antonio Plaza, who had assured her he could provide information about 
her son. When she arrived at his office, hopeful to obtain the cleric’s help, she instead 
found the Monsignor with a state police officer. The men commenced grilling Hebe de 
Bonafini about the whereabouts of her son rather than assisting her in her quest of 
information. Appalled, she left promptly.
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 Many other mothers like Hebe de Bonafini found themselves without 
recourse. Robert Cox learned from a friend that people could go to the Government 
House in the plaza of Buenos Aires to meet with officials about the disappeared. Cox 
waited in line for hours with parents like Hebe de Bonafini. Officials opened the doors at 
8:00 a.m., but people began to queue up as early as 1:00 a.m. in order to ensure a 
meeting. Cox both eavesdropped on and chatted with those in line. Mothers and fathers 
asked one another where else they could go for information and determined from one 
another which factions of the military had disappeared each other’s relatives. News of 
Cox’s interest in the disappeared spread amongst the waiters-in-line; Cox’s news office 
was full of mothers of the disappeared from that day forward. 
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The Economic Angle and Backstory of the Coup According to Naomi Klein 
Indeed the coup had disoriented and confused journalists Jacobo Timerman and 
Robert Cox, and they were not alone in their disorientation. What Timerman, Cox, and 
Dinges viewed as political intrigue, Klein argued was much more. According to the 
theories of Naomi Klein, Dr. Ewen Cameron, and Milton Friedman, disorientation was 
exactly the point of the eerily calm coup. Most Argentines, even the most well-traveled, 
well-educated members of the middle and upper classes, saw the military coup of 1976 as 
just another military overthrow, and just another set of bizarre political, economic, and 
social reforms. It was perhaps a class war, with the wealthy returning to their rightful 
place over the proletariats of Perón’s age. However, behind the scenes something much 
more sinister was occurring.  
The U.S. C.I.A. had successfully orchestrated the Chilean coup of 1973, which 
installed Augusto Pinochet as dictator-president. A primary purpose of this putsch was to 
finally give Milton Friedman his laboratory setting to implement his coveted brand of 
completely unfettered neoliberal economic policies. Friedman hoped for little to no 
government regulations in the free flow of capital through Chile. 
88
 
Milton Friedman corresponded with Pinochet and even traveled to Chile to teach 
the dictator the best way to apply the shock doctrine to economics. Pinochet seemed well 
adept in administering physical and social shocks, so in the fashion of Dr. Ewen Cameron 
and Milton Friedman, Pinochet inflicted upon Chilean society a series of economically, 
politically, and socially traumatic shocks. Shock: democratically elected president 
Salvador Allende was violently deposed with the support of the United States. Shock: 
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fighter jets and death squads attacked random Chilean citizens into a fearful state of 
docility and compliance. Shock: state police rounded up suspected dissenters, threw them 
into football stadiums, and massacred them. Shock: Pinochet deliberately depleted 
Chile’s economy in hopes that the trauma would act as a proverbial defibrillator and jolt 
the country into a state of wealth. The ferocious shock treatments resounded throughout 
Chile, making it the first violently oppressed “laboratory” in the Southern Cone. 
89
 
This system of shocks resulted in the evolution of corporatism. What Benito 
Mussolini had originally termed “corporatism” included the powerful trifecta of the 
government, business, and trade unions, all kept in running order by an authoritarian 
police state. In the name of nationalism, these corporations would function in harmony, 
contributing to a country’s economic, political, and social success. In the model adapted 
to the Southern Cone, corporatism resulted in the joining of the government with 
business, under the control of the police state. Workers were squeezed out of the trifecta, 
allowing for the pool of wealth to grow among some factions of society, but certainly not 
among all. 
90
 
The U.S. C.I.A. and the Chicago Boys, not content to test only Chile’s 
participation in the shock laboratory, moved around the Southern Cone, and instigated 
shocks in Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina. Countries that had flourished under 
developmentalism now were cursed by their involvement in Operation Condor. The 
United States backed the military governments of these Southern Cone countries and 
tirelessly attempted to implement foreign, and indeed bizarre, economic policies to their 
highly socialized, publically funded economies. The publicized violence that shocked the 
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world from Chile’s coup was to be avoided at all costs in Argentina; the goal of the 
Argentine coup was to spread terror, but to do so in a more covert, less sensational way 
than Pinochet’s revolt in Chile. Violence certainly existed in Argentina, but the 
government kept it quiet at all costs, explaining it away or denying it.
91
 
Following the bloodless coup, the Proceso junta placed Chicago Boys into 
Argentina’s economic realm of government: a new secretary of finance, a new president 
of the Banco Central, and a new research director for the department of treasury. 
Neoliberalist economists also filled various lower-level positions of government offices. 
Martínez de Hoz took over the top economic position of the country, minister of the 
economy. From a wealthy land-owning family, de Hoz, like his father and grandfather, 
had grown tired of the Peronists and the workers receiving the benefits of what he 
perceived to be his own private wealth. His post with the junta government spoke 
volumes to working-class Argentines: the junta was involving itself and its people in a 
violent class war of the rich upon the workers. The rich were ready to reclaim their 
previously redistributed wealth. Proletariats and young professionals were dubbed 
terrorists for their dissent. Like the unnamed officer had told Timerman, the memory of 
any subversives must be wiped clean in order for a new, repatterned society to break 
forth. 
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Indeed, it was the clear-cut goal of the Proceso junta to eliminate alleged 
subversives. The disappearances, which had begun under the auspices of Perón, 
multiplied dramatically following the installation of the Proceso regime as a way, in the 
order of Dr. Ewen Cameron and Milton Friedman, to utilize trauma to wipe the memories 
of Argentines clean and create a new social, political, and economic order. The Proceso 
eliminated the Montoneros within six months of gaining power. When the junta had 
eliminated those with direct ties to terrorist groups, they cast their web wider. 
93
 
To silence dissenters, the government disappeared individuals, as well as entire 
families. After the government eradicated guerrillas and known violent dissenters, those 
with no obvious political power at all were disappeared for previous associations or 
known political acquaintances. This increase of violence came in conjunction with the 
shocks to the Argentine social structure and economy. The country found itself in 
economic crises as the Junta shut down Congress, suspended the constitution, banned 
unions, and removed any potential subversives from the court systems, universities, and 
high schools.
94
 
The junta deemed the violence necessary to save Argentina from its sickness; 
extermination replaced the court system to ensure that future revolutionaries did not arise 
out of Argentine prisons. This portion of the paper will examine the meaning of being 
“disappeared” and discuss the factors that contributed to the purposes of the government 
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for disappearing its own citizens, including political affiliation, the perceived subversive 
threat, and antinational religious affiliations. 
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What It Meant to Be Disappeared 
“All…about twenty thousand people. And their relatives, too—they must be 
eradicated—and also those who remember their names….Not a trace or witness will 
remain,” the unnamed officer had told Timerman.  
Disappearance by the state implies more than simply “going away” or being “lost.” 
The terms “disappearance” and “to be disappeared” are semantic codes adopted to 
describe a person’s state of limbo. The disappeared were unaccounted for, neither here 
nor there, neither dead nor alive. Disappearance connoted a transition from personhood to 
nonpersonhood. Disappeared victims were stripped of their identities, e.g., hooded and 
kept in isolation. Guards in prisons referred to themselves as gods and to their prisoners 
as “no ones.” Military and police interrogators tortured and abused the disappeared with 
alleviated consciences; one cannot actually harm another being who is not really a person. 
96
 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights defines disappearance as “a 
true form of torture for the victim’s family and friends, because of the uncertainty they 
experience as to the fate of the victim and because they feel powerless to provide legal, 
moral, and material assistance.” Prisoners could be taken from their homes and families, 
or from their places of employment. Many had little idea why they were disappeared, and 
in this way, their confusion and disorientation furthered their susceptibility to the torture 
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they received. When people were disappeared, they were assumed to be neither dead nor 
alive; their personal history and identity were wiped clean. 
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 Though identities of the disappeared were influenced by pre-existing conditions 
that each brought with them such as emotional state, profession, and physical and mental 
strength, once brought to a prison cell, the outside world meant almost nothing to a 
disappeared person. The Argentine military arranged their holding cells in the fashion of 
Dr. Cameron’s sensory deprivation chambers. Prisoners were kept in isolation. Loud 
music was blasted over speaker systems to drown out screams. Guards mercilessly 
assured the disappeared that they no longer existed as no one would ever be able to 
locate them or save them. Disappeared persons were kept hooded or blindfolded at all 
times to perpetuate the psychological trauma of being nameless, faceless, and personless. 
Guards and military officials stole the identities of their prisoners, reducing them to 
nonhumans. Swastikas and other Nazi paraphernalia were commonly displayed while 
Hitler’s speeches were played over loudspeaker systems to invoke the terrifying air of 
concentration camps. Heavily Catholic, often anti-Semitic torture guards terrorized Jews. 
In prisons Jewish girls were sexually violated at twice the rate of Christian girls. 
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The psychological aspect of their torture played directly into the actual physical 
acts that befell them. Many prisoners were severely beaten. Women were often molested 
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and raped by guards. Pregnant women were either forced into having miscarriages or 
their babies were taken from them at birth and donated to childless military couples. Men 
and women were subjected to the electric torture of their primary sex organs. Men were 
often feminized as a form of physical and psychological torture. Jews were mocked for 
their circumcisions. Pre-existing human factors such as sex and religious affiliation were 
amplified or distorted by the torturers to further disorientation and trauma in victims.
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The Disappearance of Jacobo Timerman and the Arrest of Robert Cox 
 In April of 1977 Jacobo Timerman called his friend Robert Cox, fearing for his 
own safety. “Cox, where are they going to throw my body?” Timerman half-joked. Cox 
urged his friend not to worry; Timerman was a local celebrity. Surely the junta could not 
touch him without fear of backlash. In spite of Cox’s hopeful sentiments, he learned that 
Timerman was disappeared only weeks later. 
100
 
Jacobo Timerman wrote of his own disappearance:  
       I was kidnapped by the extremist sector of the army. From the outset, 
President Rafael Videla and General Roberto Viola tried to convert my 
disappearance into an arrest in order to save my life. They did not succeed. My 
life was spared because this extremist sector was also the heart of Nazi operations 
in Argentina. From the very first interrogation, they figured they had found what 
they’d been looking for so long: one of the sages of Zion, a central axis of the 
Jewish anti-Argentine conspiracy.
101
 
 
Timerman seemed very certain he was detained for being Jewish; other times, he 
admitted that no one ever actually gave him a reason for his disappearance. Regardless of 
the reasons behind his disappearance, Timerman’s Judaism was certainly exploited by his 
captors to evoke self-consciousness and psychological torture. In Mr. Timerman’s first 
days, perhaps weeks, in captivity, he experienced at the hands of his military captors 
alternative shocks and reliefs of the brain and body, which led to a state of perpetual 
disorientation. Guards yelled repeatedly, “Jew! Jew! Jew!” both reinforcing and mocking 
his identity.
102
 
He remained on high alert, constantly fearful, never sure when his next torture 
session would be. Interrogation sessions lasted at least twelve hours. Sometimes 
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interrogation meant physical torture, sometimes it meant only emotional abuse. All 
sessions were completely unannounced and could occur any time of day or night. Usually 
a military-affiliated doctor examined Mr. Timerman during and following each visit with 
Susan to ensure that no permanent physical damage—evidence—could be detected. 
Priests visited prisoners between torture sessions, praying for their subversive souls, 
“encouraging” them at the behest of the junta. 
103
 
Interrogation sessions invoked frustration via déjà vu in Timerman; military 
inquisitors executed a similar sequence of questions and demands, which, over time, 
became increasingly absurd: Are you Jewish? Are you Zionist? Is La Opinión Zionist? 
Do you travel to Israel? Provide details of the Andinia Plan in which you Jews plan to 
overthrow Argentina.
104
  
The lifelong identity that Jacobo Timerman had cultivated—that of a Jew, a 
Zionist, a journalist, and a political activist—was being called into question and put under 
the scrutiny of his government and his own introspection. Timerman, in constant physical 
and mental anguish, had extensive time to himself, to meditate and evaluate his 
circumstances and the potential outcomes of his responses to his environment.
105
 
In order to preserve his identity as a journalist, as a family man, and as a Jew, 
Jacobo Timerman observed his own thought patterns. When Timerman first arrived to his 
torture cell, he found his brain disoriented and overstimulated, constantly on alert. He 
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constantly thought of his wife, Risha, and her beautiful eyes. He composed soliloquies 
called “Risha’s Eyes” in his mind to occupy himself and keep his thoughts focused away 
from disorientation and torture. Apart from Risha’s eyes, Timerman found comfort and 
solidarity in the eyes of his fellow captives. Inside the torture cells, prisoners, though 
separated, would catch one another’s glances, exchanging in looks what words could not 
express. Timerman was able to keep hope alive thanks to the smallest gestures shared by 
his comrade detainees. Timerman found however that the hope of escape and the memory 
of life outside the cell were too much for his shocked brain and body to handle. “And the 
chief enemy,” he noted, “is not the electric shocks, but penetration from the outside 
world, with all its memories.” 
106
 
Exhausted from sustained physical and mental abuse, Timerman realized that he 
was completely unable to mentally, physically, and emotionally last for very long under 
such extreme conditions of duress. He waited for insanity, prayed for it, to relax his mind 
and body, and completely disconnect him from his surroundings. When the insanity did 
not come, he decided he could no longer pretend to logically argue with his inquisitors; 
he could no longer even attempt to exert the most meager level of interest towards his 
authoritarian torturers. Timerman, brutalized and battered, consciously made a decision 
that completely shifted his identity and went contrary to every ideal he had ever believed 
and every action he had ever performed: he gave up. 
107
 
This change to Timerman’s identity was not permanent. It was merely a 
temporary shift to preserve what sanity he felt was left inside his traumatized brain and 
body. Timerman’s colleague Robert Cox was approaching insanity on the outside of the 
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cell. Worried sick for the lives of his captured comrade and for his family, Cox became 
increasingly nervous, but continued a vocal campaign against the violence of Argentina. 
Cox contacted President Videla on Timerman’s behalf, urging him to legalize 
Timerman’s arrest if not set him free. Cox continued meeting with those whose relatives 
had been disappeared and printed plea after plea, begging the regime to end its use of 
violence against the Marxist and Peronist guerrillas and against the innocent citizens 
caught in the wake of state-sponsored terrorism. Cox used The Herald as a mouthpiece of 
reason to speak to his fellow Argentines—to crack the illusion that many lived under: the 
expectation that the military junta would eventually restore order to violence and chaos. 
Cox could tell no end was in sight as long as violence was used to combat violence.
108
 
One week later Betty Lombardo, a staffer at The Herald, phoned Maud, Robert 
Cox’s wife. “I have good news and bad news to tell you,” Betty said carefully. “They 
arrested Bob today, but they have not made him disappear.” 
109
 
Federal police took Robert Cox to their headquarters in Buenos Aires under the 
pretext of violating press restrictions. Cox was made to strip and was thrown into the 
basement of federal police headquarters. The antechamber of his holding cell was 
decorated with a large swastika. Cox was released the following day at the behest of the 
enraged United States and British governments, as well as due to pressure from his 
colleagues of the international press. Cox was not officially disappeared, but the arrest 
was enough to shake him to his core. Outside the cell, Cox contacted as many diplomats 
and government officials in the United States and United Kingdom as he possibly could. 
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Highly traumatized, he spoke out with a renewed fervor on behalf of those still locked 
away, those hooded and nameless victims in prison cells without number. 
110
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Chapter 4 
Human Rights Efforts on Behalf of the Disappeared: The Identity of Solidarity 
within the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo 
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Robert Cox and the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo 
 Upon Robert Cox’s release from prison, he began making as many beneficial 
friends as possible. Cox gained hope when United States President Jimmy Carter, newly 
elected, announced his mission to restore human rights to the Southern Cone. Cox hailed 
the work of Carter’s assistant secretary for human rights, Patricia Derian, and formed 
close ties with F. Allen Harris, the United States ambassador to Buenos Aires. Ed Koch, a 
congressman from New York, had been actively watching the Sothern Cone for years, 
and was instrumental in raising awareness of the United States’ involvement in Operation 
Condor. Cox counted it a victory when the United States cut aid to Uruguay and then 
Argentina. Cox published editorials, articles, and columns, exercising what remaining 
press power he had to demand the release of his journalist colleagues, and of the 
thousands of other disappeared  
Argentines. 
111
  
 With the changes on the front of the United States’ involvement came changes 
from the ground up inside of Argentina. The mothers that had flooded the Buenos Aires 
streets and government offices in search of their missing children began recognizing one 
another, running into each other in various news offices and government building. 
Frustrated and at a loss, Azucena Villaflor de Devicenti, a housewife, exclaimed to those 
women around her, including the familiar face of Hebe de Bonafini, “We are wasting 
time. What we have to do is go to the Plaza de Mayo.” 
112
 
                                                        
111 Cox, Dirty Secrets, Dirty War, Kindle edition. John Dinges, The Condor Years: How 
Pinochet and His Allies Brought Terrorism to Three Continents, 218.  
112 Matilde Mellibovsky Circle of Love Over Death: Testimonies of the Mothers of the 
Plaza de Mayo, (Willimantic, CT: Curbstone Press, 1997), 15. 
 79 
 Hebe de Bonafini looked at Azucena and the other women around them, realizing 
that the brusque officers behind high desks could easily ignore their singular emotional 
cries. The key to their success would be solidarity, organizing together and finding 
strength in numbers. Though Azucena’s idea was well received by the women around 
her, none had political experience; their entire lives consisted of being inside their homes, 
being mothers.  
Hebe Bonafini forwent a formal education in lieu of getting married. She felt she 
was not a complete person until she became a mother; her children gave birth to her, 
teaching her to be politically conscious and socially minded. It was not until Jorge 
deBonafini, Hebe’s son, was disappeared that she took on an active identity outside her 
home. “I kept thinking that I’d go crazy if I stood still,” she stated. She ran around filling 
out forms and visiting government offices until she learned of Azucena’s plan to meet at 
the Plaza de Mayo. “I wasn’t sure how I felt about it, but I went.” 
113
 
 Matilde Mellibovsky, another familiar mother, decided to attend as well, in hopes 
of ending her phase of “madness.” Following the disappearance of her daughter Graciela, 
Mellibovsky found herself feeling increasingly “demented.” Her life had been dedicated 
to raising “Gra”; without Gra, Mellibovsky was empty and lonely. She began to lose her 
faculties. Her daughter’s disappearance was a turning point from “normal life” into an 
evolving identity of childless motherhood. Until Mellibovsky ran into Azucena Villaflor 
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de Devicenti and Hebe de Bonafini, she talked to street tiles and fortunetellers, grasping 
at even the most unorthodox manners of locating her beloved Gra.
114
 
 On April 30, 1977, days after the arrests of Jacobo Timerman and Robert Cox, the 
Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo began their march towards justice. Asucena Villaflor,  
Hebe de Bonafini, Matilde Mellibovsky, and eleven other mothers met for the first time 
in the Plaza de Mayo to publically march to demand justice on behalf of their children. 
Catholics and Jews, Peronists and anti-Peronists united under their shared identity: mom. 
They timidly shuffled around the plaza, silently but visibly extending their roles of 
“mother” outside their homes. 
115
 
The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo wore matching white panuelos. They tied 
these diapers on their heads as kerchiefs, symbols of the purity, of motherhood, and of the 
innocence of lost youth. Many individual mothers stitched the names of their beloved lost 
loved ones on their kerchiefs. Other mothers felt that each mother’s lost child was her 
own, and to stitch one child’s name in her panuelo would be disrespectful to the 
thousands of other disappeared children. Over time the women agreed that solid white 
presented a more unified front, and the names of their children were left off the panuelos. 
Most mothers carried worn, faded photographs of their children that they showed to 
anyone interested; others carried trinkets or toys that reminded them of their lost loved 
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ones. The mothers, housewives unused to public spectacle, were unsure what to expect 
the first time they gathered in the plaza. They huddled together and ambled around the 
Plaza de Mayo, utilizing the civil disobedience tactics of Gandhi and the Rev. Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr.
116
 
An angry police officer approached the women and immediately demanded they 
“circulate.” Though he hoped this would break up the small band of women, it actually 
gave them a brilliant but simple idea—to march together in circles. And so they did. Two 
by two, the mothers linked arms and walked around the plaza following one another in 
wide circles, a silent parade of panuelos in the sun. Their circle became a symbol in itself 
of solidarity, the never-ending love of a mother, and of their never-ending search for their 
children. 
117
 
Each week as the women met, their ranks grew. The once-timid mothers now 
marched with confidence. They demanded to be granted entrance to the Casa Rosada, the 
Buenos Aires White House to plead their case; they hand-delivered a letter to the Pope. 
Their increased numbers in the plaza and around Buenos Aires garnered the attention of 
the public and the press. Though they were initially dubbed “lunatics” by the military 
junta and their tainted state-controlled periodicals, the message of the Mothers of the 
Plaza de Mayo, the message of justice and humanity, resonated with the oppressed 
Argentineans. 
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Robert Cox re-appropriated the term “lunatics,” in relation to the mothers, writing 
privately and publicly about the “Mad Mothers,” amplifying their cry for human rights. 
Cox’s publication of the women’s growing ranks garnered them much support and 
solidarity within their country. Nearly every Argentine knew someone who had been 
disappeared; every Argentine had a mother. The New York Times and several European 
news sources began printing blurbs about the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo. International 
support grew for the women’s group, casting the stay-at-home moms under a global 
spotlight. 
119
 
In December 1977 a small group of French nuns joined the mothers out of 
international solidarity. As the women marched, a young man who presented himself as 
Gustavo Niño joined them, stating that his brother was disappeared and his mother was 
too ill to join the ranks of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo. Sister Alice Domon, one of 
the visiting nuns, repeatedly warned the man that he was endangering himself by publicly 
marching with the women. The man paid no attention to her warning, and proceeded with 
a small group of the women to a mass at the Church of Santa Cruz. 
120
 
In the church, the young man kissed the faces of several of the mothers and nuns. 
Following what David Cox called “the kiss of Judas,” military officers swooped in and 
kidnapped Azucena Villaflor, Ponce de Bianco, Esther Ballestrina deCareaga, 
Angela Aguad, and Sister Alice Domon. Two days later, Sister Léonie Duquet, the sixty-
two-year-old companion of Sister Alice, was also disappeared. Gustavo Niño was, in 
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reality, Alfredo Astiz of the Argentine navy. Nicknamed “The Blond Angel,” Astiz 
ensured that all of the mothers present were tortured and dumped into a mass grave. 
Sister Alice Domon, following a brutal beating and rape, disappeared permanently; 
her body was never recovered. 
121
 
A Swedish judge called for the arrest of Astiz, as he was also wanted for the 
murder of a Swedish citizen who lived in Buenos Aires. The girl’s father wrote a book 
about the search for his daughter and repeatedly attempted to bring The Blond Angel to 
justice. French authorities, outraged at the disappearance of the nuns, declared him a 
murderer and tenaciously called for his arrest, voicing their solidarity with the Mothers of 
the Plaza de Mayo over their own personal losses. French President Valery Giscard 
d’Estaing demanded Argentine’s President Videla turn over Astiz to the French 
government. Argentine, American, and European news outlets publicized this shocking 
violation of international human rights law. The Argentine government immediately 
“closed ranks” to protect Astiz, and they released a phony letter and photograph, 
attempting to tie the nuns to the then-defunct Montoneros guerrilla group. Human rights 
groups world wide applied increasing pressure on the Argentine junta to cease its 
propagation of state-sponsored terrorism.
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 Rather than change tactics, the Argentine junta opted for a facelift. With the 1978 
World Cup finals close at hand, the junta needed a miracle to ensure the success of the 
Buenos Aires event. Hiring a public relations firm out of the United States, the military 
junta planted false stories in Argentine and international press sources. General Videla 
told La Nación, the nationally acquired newspaper, his most famous bold-faced lie: 
“There are no disappearances, they’re a nonentity, they don’t exist.” Henry Kissinger, an 
operative of the C.I.A. with direct ties to Operation Condor, attended the World Cup as 
President Videla’s guest. Mrs. Maud Cox eyed him uncomfortably at an embassy 
reception following a match, unable to enjoy herself due to the political intrigue around 
her.
123
 
In 1978 the Proceso junta applied pressure to The Buenos Aires Herald to 
decrease its coverage and praise for the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo. Rather than cease 
and desist, Cox encouraged his star journalist Uki Goñi to interview as many mothers as 
he could and obtain writs of habeas corpus for as many women’s children as possible. 
When Goñi was unable to go on assignment, Cox went in his stead.
124
 
The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo became international celebrities, not because 
they sought to change the political or economic structure of their country, but rather 
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because their country changed the definition of their roles as “mother” by disappearing 
their children. The Proceso junta under the political auspice of Operation Condor, in 
conjunction with economic policies of disaster capitalism, and with its strong ties to 
Catholic traditionalism regressed Argentine women politically, economically and 
socially. This attempt backfired. By shocking the Argentine family and disappearing 
thousands of children, the junta created a generation of “childless mothers.” In response 
to the threat against their families and to the desecration of their identities, the Mothers of 
the Plaza de Mayo rose up out of oppression and created for themselves a new identity. 
No longer the Peronist consumer-domestics of the faux-glamours days of Evita, these 
women flooded the Plaza de Mayo with new strongly politicized identities: the identities 
of mothers of the disappeared.  
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Chapter 5 
Exiles and Conclusions  
  
 87 
Identities at the End of the Dirty War: Two Journalists in Exile 
Jacobo Timerman was released into exile in 1979. After spending twenty-nine 
months in various military prisons and under house arrest, Timerman joined his family in 
Israel. Though his time as a member of the disappeared had been in no way restful, 
Timerman’s period of passivity for the sake of his sanity had ended. Like Hebe de 
Bonafini, Timerman began frenetically working, keeping himself busy, and dedicating 
himself to the cause of the disappeared. Timerman picked up his writing almost 
immediately upon arriving at his son’s home in the Ein Shemer kibbutz. 
125
 
Jacobo Timerman, a political activist since his youth, returned to his state of 
professional and political activity a changed man. Shocked by the trauma of his 
imprisonment and torture, Timerman, while under arrest, was unable to mentally deal 
with the pain of memory. Upon his release, he carried an evolved fear of memory with 
him.  
He wondered, “Have any of you ever looked into the eyes of another person, on 
the floor of a cell, who knows that he’s about to die though no one has told him?...Each 
time I write or utter words of hope…I’m fearful—fearful of losing sight of one of those 
gazes.”
126
 
Timerman’s identity, that of a Jew and that of an activist, no longer centered 
around (anti-)Peronist politics. The physical and psychological shocks of the Proceso 
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junta did not repattern Jacobo Timerman, but rather further prodded him in his quest to 
provide a voice for the underdog, for the abused, for the disappeared.  
He recalled in his memoir, “Those gazes…which I’ve retained one by one, were 
the culminating point, the purest moment of my tragedy.” Disappearance was Jacobo 
Timerman’s ticket to solidarity, his new identifier, and his purpose for continuing in 
journalism and practicing his Judaism. 
127
 
Timerman received word from the Argentine government that if he published his 
memoirs, he would be putting his Argentine family and friends in danger. “Robert John 
Cox, editor of the Buenos Aires Herald, has been marked for assassination by hard-liners 
in the Argentine government,” a certain Rabbi Marshall Meyer told Patricia Derian, who 
relayed the news to Bob Cox. Cox, used to threats, brushed it off. However, when he 
arrived home, he found his youngest son, Peter, upset by an official letter, which had 
been addressed to Ignacio Pedro Cox, Peter’s full name. 
128
 
The letter, a threat against the entire Cox family, was forged to appear as if it were 
from the Montoneros. Cox recognized it as from the Proceso junta. The letter detailed the 
Coxes’s daily schedules, the address of their summer home, and the names of the Cox’s 
close acquaintances. Further information in the letter led Cox to believe that their home 
had been bugged, and officials were listening to private family conversations. Cox 
demanded a meeting with President Videla.
129
  
“I am very sad to hear you are leaving. Please stay with your family,” President 
Videla told him, knowledgeable of the intrigue surrounding the journalist. When Cox 
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indicated that his family’s safety was his priority, Videla again urged him to stay, 
informing him that the junta almost collapsed following the release of Jacobo Timerman. 
Cox begged the president to end the disappearances in Argentina; Videla responded that 
he was not in control of his own government. Disheartened, Cox left, packed up his 
family, and left Argentina. What was meant to be a year-long furlough ended up being 
permanent exile for the Coxes. The political and economic conditions of the country 
continued to deteriorate and fall out of Videla’s control. Cox and his family settled in the 
United States, where Cox was instrumental in convincing the United Nations to intervene 
on behalf of survivors of Argentina prison camps. 
130
 
The voices of the disappeared Argentines that Cox could not save haunted both 
his dreams and his waking hours. He continued his work as a journalist, but found it 
increasingly painful and difficult to write about the “monsters” of the Argentine military 
junta and the thousands of people who were killed at their hands. Cox, deeply shocked by 
the Dirty War, found a new identity in his American exile; though he remained true to his 
duties of job and family, he struggled to put behind him the memories that plagued his 
dreams and haunted his children. In the preface of Dirty Secrets, Dirty War, Robert Cox 
repeatedly thanked his son David for providing an unbiased journalistic voice to the story 
of the Dirty War they lived through, for writing the story he himself could not bring 
himself to write.
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The Fall of the Junta and the Continuation of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo 
 Following the United States’ aid cuts to the Southern Cone during the Carter 
administration, Argentina found itself in another economic crisis. Combined with a losing 
war against Great Britain in the Malvinas/Falklands, Argentina’s coffers, once 
overflowing during the Depression, were now dangerously empty.  Even when the 
military junta was forced to concede to democratic elections in 1983, the tenents of 
neoliberal economics had become so deeply entrenched into the Argentine system that an 
economic recovery was impossible to procure. 
132
 
 “It was as if that blood, the blood of the disappeared, covered up the cost of the 
economic program,” Claudia Acuña, an Argentine journalist and teacher, shared in an 
interview with Naomi Klein. The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo cared little about the 
economic or political side of the story; to them the blood of their children was all that 
mattered. The blood of their children at the hand of disaster capitalism and the Proceso 
junta served as catalysts for these docile, domestic ladies to evolve into strong political 
forces with whom to be reckoned. 
133
 
Like journalists Jacobo Timerman and Robert Cox, the Mothers of the Plaza de 
Mayo utilized the political, economic, and cultural torture shocks designed to repattern 
them into submission as impetuses for increased political action and the development of 
their own heightened identities dependent upon the quest for human rights in Argentina. 
From the days of (anti-)Peronism through the end of the Dirty War, the national 
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Argentine identity shifted out of oppression and violence, prodded by shocks to 
individuals and societies, to create an Argentina of survivors, an Argentina that moves 
towards economic and political stability, paving its way on the blood memory of the 
disappeared.  
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